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Abstract: 
The suggestion of a mind-brain duality that emerges out of Descartes’ cogito argument is 
assessed in the context of twenty-first century neuroscience.  The Cartesian texts are 
explored in order to qualify the extent to which the cogito necessitates such dualism and 
the functions that Descartes attributes to a non-corporeal soul are precisely defined.  The 
relationship between the mind and brain is explored in the context of a number 
neuroscientific phenomena, including sensory perception, blindsight, amusia, phantom 
limb syndrome, frontal lobe lesions, and the neurodevelopmental disorder Williams 
syndrome, with an attempt to illuminate the physiological basis for each.  Juxtaposing the 
two perspectives, the author concludes that Descartes hypothesis of a disembodied soul is 
no longer necessary and that a purely physiological understanding of the human mind is 
now possible, and that there is an underlying affinity between this assertion and Descartes 
theory of mind.   
 
Introduction: 
Descartes is perhaps most famously known for his statement, “cogito ergo sum,” 
or “I think, therefore I am,” and the notion of a distinction between the physical body and 
the mind, or disembodied soul that apparently arises from the cogito.  This seems 
fundamentally at odds with the field of modern neuroscience, which seeks to explain 
human mental life in terms of neurons and their electrical activity.  The present 
investigation seeks to counter that claim and demonstrate that rather than the impediment 
to a physiological understanding of the human mind that Cartesian philosophy has often 
been touted as, the two actually have a natural affinity and that substance dualism is not 
in fact an essential tenet of Descartes, but rather a largely anachronistic addition.   
The study begins with a modern reformulation of the primary Cartesian texts with 
the intent of separating the distortions that have accumulated over the past four centuries 
from pure Descartes.  What emerges is a less contentious system than what has come to 
be known as Cartesian dualism, and while Descartes is not absolved of hypothesizing a 
fundamental separation of mind and body and a disembodied soul, the author maintains 
that he does so as consequence of the ideological, scientific, and theological landscape of 
the seventeenth century.  Further, the author asserts that such a hypothesis is no longer 
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necessary, and that it served as a placeholder in Descartes’ theory of mind, a black box 
whose contents could not be understood within the confines of his environment, but one 
that we can now open.   
The final assertion is that Descartes would readily concede to a purely 
neurophysiological explanation of the human mind and all of its capacities in the context 
of our twenty-first century understanding of these phenomena, that our present landscape 
and the conclusions that have emerged are not at odds with Descartes, but rather an 
increase in precision and refinement of theory that comes with the increased clarity that 
accompanies the passage of time in the evolution of scientific thought.  The harmony 
between the essential tenets of Descartes, a desire for firm conclusions and increased 
explanatory power, and the modern quest to understand the physiological mind manifests 
when one removes these prejudices and the apparent dissonance evaporates. 
 
The Mind-Body Problem Articulated: 
 René Descartes was a prolific writer who over the fifty-four years of his life 
contributed a wealth of theory and knowledge to both science and philosophy.  This 
investigation makes no claim to examine the entirety of the Cartesian body of work, but 
rather to distill the fundamental ideas from his major works into a concise but 
representative statement of his philosophy as it pertains to the mind-body duality that 
emerges as an apparent consequence of the cogito argument.  This task requires carefully 
navigating between the Scylla of simply choosing the elements of Descartes that appear 
most pertinent to the present discussion and failing to consider the larger context of his 
complete ideology, inevitably misrepresenting him, and the Charybdis of attempting to 
simultaneously consider all of Descartes’ writing, which spans thirty years and is at times 
self-contradictory.  Moreover the latter pitfall carries the further danger of including 
obsolete and outdated ideas that would render any serious attempt at criticism almost 
farcical.  The final caveat is that, while Descartes is obviously the focal point of the 
investigation, the ideas take precedence over the man, and the mind-body problem that 
the author intends to submit to a neuroscientific investigation may not wholly represent 
the one realized by the man who first articulated it, though every attempt to minimize this 
drift is made, and the distortion of Descartes’ ideas that has occurred over the past four 
hundred years is not what is intended by this concession.  Thus the initial goal is to 
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consider the development of the cogito argument and its corollary of a dichotomy 
between body and mind as it is traced from Descartes’ early writings, Regulae ad 
directionem ingenii (Rules for the Direction of the Mind, 1621, published posthumously) 
and Le Monde (The World, never published) and his philosophical treatises Discourse on 
Method (1637), Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Principles of Philosophy (1644) 
and Passions of the Soul (1649), and to extract from this body of work a composite 
statement of the mind-body duality as Descartes would have framed it.  The cogito itself 
only appears explicitly in Discourse on Method and Principles of Philosophy, and 
Cartesian dualism today is quite precisely and homogeneously defined, but rather than 
accept these principles at face value, the author intends to begin the present investigation 
as Descartes does his and “raze everything to the ground and begin again from the 
original foundations17.” 
 Descartes’ body of work reveals a characteristic shift from the overtly scientific 
and mathematical style of the Regulae and Le Monde, his earlier unpublished works, to 
the philosophy, theology, and metaphysics that characterize his subsequent writing.  In Le 
Monde he explores physiology, astronomy, and physics.  Another motif that runs through 
nearly all of his works is the question of epistemology.  The Regulae, though never 
finished, was intended to consist of thirty-six rules divided into three groups of twelve, 
the first of which was concerned with basic principles of properly ordering knowledge, 
the second with addressing problems where the question could at least be framed and 
understood irrespective of whether a solution was available, and the third where the 
problem itself could not be perfectly understood39.  This epistemological question 
continues through Discourse and Meditations where Descartes introduces the concept of 
radical doubt and abandons deductive reasoning based on sensory observation in search 
of a first principle of which he can be absolutely convinced.  From this emerges the 
cogito, “I think, therefore I am,” which he articulates explicitly in Discourse and 
Principles and alludes to in Meditations.  Having established that he exists, and 
identifying himself as a “thinking thing,” or res cogitans, he proceeds to surmise whether 
in fact his body exists, and from this emerges the conclusion that mind and body are two 
different types of substances, with two different essential qualities – thought and 
extension, respectively, and are therefore necessarily separate.  This argument, more or 
Hendriksen 4 
less, though with slightly different emphasis, unfolds in each Descartes’ three major 
philosophical works – Discourse, Meditations, and Principles.  The full title of the 
intermediate work, Meditations on First Philosophy in which the Existence of God and 
the Distinction between the Soul and the Body are Demonstrated, highlights the two most 
ambitious claims of his philosophy.  Finally, in his last major work, Passions of the Soul, 
Descartes recapitulates some of the basic physiology from Le Monde and explores 
emotion and the means by which the body and soul interact. 
 
‘Razing Everything to the Ground’: 
 What preceded was essentially a summary of orthodox Descartes, which the 
author now intends to expand, qualify, and revise in order to present a more accurate and 
univocal representation of Cartesian philosophy as it pertains to the mind-body duality.  
Desmond Clarke points out the danger of reading Descartes through the lens of a single 
work9; a concern which pays tribute to Descartes’ own style of hyperbolic doubt.  Clarke 
maintains that taking substance dualism, the notion that mind and body are necessarily 
separate because they have a different essence, as a first principle and retrofitting it to 
Descartes’ earlier works where such metaphysical questions were not yet even posed 
obscures his intentions and elevates the mind-body dichotomy above its rightful place in 
the entire consortium.  As a consequence of four centuries of distortion, Clarke identifies 
a situation where we have “the emergence of Descartes the metaphysician who was a 
substance dualist, rather than the Descartes the natural philosopher who flirted briefly 
with substance dualism only when dutifully making his contribution to the Catholic 
Counter-Reformation9.”  Such religious influence is readily evident; in response to 
Galileo’s trial, Descartes refrained from publishing his own scientific treatise, Le Monde, 
and destroyed many of his other writings.  Gordon Baker and Katherine Morris make a 
similar case in Descartes’ Dualism4, maintaining that the modern school of thought 
known as Cartesian Dualism would be unrecognizable to the man who gave it his 
namesake.  They agree with Clarke that “Descartes’ discussion of theological and 
metaphysical issues” is “the engagement of a reluctant participant with the politically 
dominant ideologies of his time9” rather than an integral part of his theory of mind. 
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 Baker and Morris also highlight another potential pitfall, and like them, “[the 
author] refrain[s] from playing the popular party game of constructing refutations of 
Cartesian dualism.4”  Rather than repeat the obvious superficial objections to a mind-
brain duality – the problem of a non-physical entity causing motion, the question of the 
physiological locus for interaction, or the “ghost in the machine problem,” or to look for 
logical fallacies in Descartes’ reasoning, this investigation aspires to the more noble aim 
of showing that what served as an appropriate placeholder in the seventeenth century is 
no longer necessary in the twenty-first due to a radically different scientific and social 
landscape.  This shift is akin to changing the rules of a game; it redefines the boundary 
between sense and nonsense, and determines what questions are permissible and 
relevant4.  Thus to conduct a sensical analysis, one must maintain awareness of this 
evolution of thought and abandon those questions that no longer meet these criteria and 
reframe the essential ones so that they do.  Similarly, the author does not intend to 
criticize the trivial points of Descartes’ science and philosophy – that animals do not feel 
pain, the anatomical localization of the soul in the pineal gland, or the thermodynamic 
model of blood circulation.  Such an endeavor would be futile and would distract from 
the primary object to establish a revisionist but true Cartesian theory of mind that can be 
juxtaposed with modern neuroscience without being wholly anachronistic.   
 Descartes himself was utterly aware of the possibility of being misrepresented.  
He writes in a letter to Chanut, “A certain Father Bourdin thought he had good reason to 
accuse me of being a sceptic, because I refuted the skeptics; and a certain minister tried to 
argue that I was an atheist, without giving any reason other than the fact that I tried to 
prove the existence of God4.”  Ignoring for the moment Descartes’ particular religious 
claims and focusing solely on the irony, one can readily ascertain Descartes’ expectation 
that his work would be received with great difficulty even in his own time, nevermind 
after a four century game of telephone.  In the dedication to Meditations he recognizes 
that “although [he] believes [his] arguments to be certain and evident, still [he is] not 
thereby convinced that they are suited to everyone’s grasp17.”  He is “fearful that many 
people will not be capable of adequately perceiving them… …because they demand a 
mind that is quite free from prejudices17.”  He explicitly identifies the mind-body duality 
as one of the most elusive parts of his philosophy: “It does not seem to me that the human 
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mind is capable of forming a very distinct conception of both the distinction between the 
soul and the body and their union; for to do this it is necessary to conceive them as a 
single thing and at the same time to conceive them as two things; and this is absurd9” and 
thus begins the arduous task of attempting to understand the theory whose own proponent 
labels its conclusion as such. 
 
The Cartesian Texts: 
 The present work traces the development of Cartesian philosophy approximately 
chronologically, beginning with the epistemological question first posed in the Regulae 
and rearticulated in nearly every one of Descartes’ major works.  Descartes sought to find 
a “new and stable basis for all knowledge17,” be it scientific, philosophical, or theological 
knowledge.  The impetus for this was an epiphany he had in 1619 whereby he sought to 
replicate the certainty and precision he found in mathematics with regard to all other 
knowledge.  His methodology was essentially to erect a new system upon which 
conclusions could be made with absolute certainty by first rejecting all preconceived 
notions and existing opinions.  In Meditation One he begins by acknowledging that he 
has accumulated a battery of false opinions over his lifetime, and resolves to “apply 
[himself] earnestly and unreservedly to the general demolition of [these] opinions17.”  He 
progresses through the permutation where it becomes adequate not to prove that his 
opinions are necessarily false, but simply to cast doubt on them, and then that only the 
most fundamental opinions upon which the others rest require this treatment; “because 
undermining the foundations will cause whatever has been built upon them to crumble of 
its own accord17.”  He first describes this process in Discourse where he identifies three 
fundamental principles that he intends to reject, the senses, reasoning, and the certainty of 
wakefulness.  He asserts that “nothing was exactly as our senses would have us 
imagine16” and “resolved to pretend that everything that had ever entered [his] mind was 
no more true than the illusions of [his] dreams16.” 
 As in Discourse Descartes’ first target in Meditation One is sensory perception.  
In direct contrast to the established method of sensory information constituting the only 
certainty and deductive reasoning following to establish conclusions from the observed 
world, Descartes maintains that the information from our senses cannot be assumed 
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reliable.  Nor can one assume that he is awake; “there are no definitive signs by which to 
distinguish being awake from being asleep17,” and if that is the case, then the objects of 
sensory perception do not correspond to objects in the physical world but rather the 
contents of dreams.  He then questions whether the representation of objects in a dream 
necessitates their existence or at least potential for existence; i.e., is it possible to form a 
representation of something that does not otherwise exist?  The next conclusion is that 
there is sufficient doubt for him to postulate that corporeal things do not exist at all; 
“body, shape, extension, and movement are all chimeras17,” and he reaffirms the 
conclusion of Discourse even more adamantly at the end of Meditation One, “everything 
I see is false17.” 
 Thus Descartes’ search for an adequate first principle begins by casting doubt on 
one’s most fundamental beliefs.  Before turning to what he ultimately concludes can be 
accepted without doubt, his own existence, the core of the cogito argument, consider two 
features of Descartes’ method of radical doubt.  Though Descartes postulates that his 
sensory information is deceptive, he cannot be sure that he is awake, and his body nor 
any other corporeal objects exist, he does so as a logical exercise.  This may seem 
obvious but one does not expect him to retain these conclusions, rather the purpose of 
rejecting these beliefs is to ultimately reinstate them on more stable foundations, and the 
conclusion of the cogito is not that the only certainty is that a non-corporeal self can be 
assumed to exist, but rather that this is the only stable first principle that can be taken as 
self-evident.  The second important observation is the context in which Descartes begins 
his search.  While the method is most completely articulated in the metaphysical context 
of Discourse and Meditations, it is a ubiquitous feature of Descartes’ writing, and he 
declares at the beginning of Meditations, “I realized that once in my life I had to raze 
everything to the ground and begin again from the original foundations, if I wanted to 
establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences17.”  Though Descartes clashed with the 
empiricists on the reliability of sensory information, his initial foray into the search for 
knowledge was as a natural philosopher, and his method of hyperbolic doubt in this 
context can be seen as the addition of a preliminary step to the scientific method rather 
than a radically different process. 
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Descartes the Natural Philosopher: 
 At this juncture a survey of Descartes the scientist, or natural philosopher, proves 
advantageous.  Descartes’ scientific writing, very little of which is extant, and which is 
comprised of Le Monde, A Treatise on Man, A Description of the Human Body, and The 
Dioptrics, was chiefly concerned with physics, physiology, and animal behavior.  Rather 
than to extensively catalog Descartes’ largely supplanted scientific theories, this brief 
survey intends to highlight the context in which they emerged and the affinity between 
the particular scientific domains he investigated and the theory of mind that emerges out 
of the composite of his scientific and philosophical writing. 
Cartesian mechanics* maintained that matter can only be set into motion by other 
moving matter and rejected the concept of action at a distance.  Note simply here that 
Descartes did the majority of his scientific writing between 1620 and 1640; Isaac Newton 
was born in 1643.  Moreover, Descartes’ understanding of matter, which for him is the 
fundamental distinction between corporeal substances and mental substances, must be 
understood as pre-classical mechanics, pre-atomic theory, and thus cannot be held to 
today’s much more rigorous definition.  Descartes’ work in physics and his formulation 
of a theory of matter also renders it unlikely for him to later maintain that a non-physical 
entity causes bodily motion; he explicitly denies a strict causal role for the soul in moving 
the body in Passions, but the juxtaposition of these two ideas serves the role of 
reinforcing the ultimate place for mind-body dualism in a coherent representation of 
Descartes. 
 Just as the Cartesian theory of matter preceded Newton mechanics, Descartes 
attempted to explain physiology before the invention of the light microscope.  By the 
standards of his time, Descartes’ physiology was actually quite impressive.  He 
accurately described digestion and absorption, antagonistic muscular contraction and 
relaxation, and circulation of the blood.  With respect to the latter, Descartes expanded 
William Harvey’s explanation, and accurately described the path blood traverses from the 
right ventricle through the pulmonary and systemic circulation back to the right atria, 
though he attributed the motion to be caused by rarefication resulting from thermal 
function of the heart rather than mechanical pumping.  Though by Descartes’ time the 
                                                     
* As in the subdiscipline of physics 
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consensus was that the brain was the anatomical locus of mental function† and Aristotle’s 
attribution of this to the heart was largely supplanted, Descartes contributed to denying 
any role for the heart other than the circulation of blood in Le Monde and Passions.   
Descartes’ crude physiology actually contributed precursors for many systems 
and mechanisms that were impressive first approximations considering the absence of 
microscopy or an understanding of cell theory, and many of his ideas, particularly 
regarding neural and endocrine function, have only been revised with regard to precise 
mechanism rather than underlying theory.  Descartes understood the function of the 
circulation as a transport system between different parts of the body; the agents being 
transported he termed animal spirits.  The naïve interpretation is to consider this 
consistent with Gilbert Ryle’s classification of Cartesian dualism as a “ghost in the 
machine9,” but a brief consideration of the etymology of the phrase reveals the contrary.  
‘Animal’ refers to mechanical, or pure physiological function, i.e. capacities humans 
share entirely with other animals, and ‘spirit’ is to be understood as simply a fluid 
medium, in the sense that wine is a spirit, excluding any connotations to non-corporeality, 
and Descartes’ animal spirits can be understood as proto-endocrine hormones rather than 
some abstract theoretical entity. 
Descartes described nerve signaling as completely mechanical; he supposed that 
afferent and efferent neural transmission was the consequence of physical tension in 
nerve fibers that originated at either the brain or the periphery and effected a response at 
the other end, “in the same way in which, when we pull one end of a cord, we make the 
other move19.”  While this explanation is devoid of the neurites, action potentials, and 
neurotransmitters we understand today to be the mechanism of such signaling, these 
concepts could not have even been conceived without the basic understanding of the cell.  
A remarkable feature of Descartes’ explanation is his speculation, which he makes with 
specific regard to pain transduction, that this organization of nerves allows perception of 
a stimulus by the brain interpreted to originate at the peripheral terminus of a nerve fiber, 
to in fact arise anywhere along the nerve and still be perceived as such.  This property has 
                                                     
† The phrase mental function is used loosely here as a general term taken to include sensation, 
perception, control of motion, intellect, emotion, language, learning, memory, executive function, 
rational and abstract thought, autonomic and vegetative function; i.e., anything attributed to the 
brain, without consideration of the historical or theoretical context.  A more precise definition is 
not critical at this point. 
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been readily demonstrated in conditions such as trigeminal neuralgia or phantom-limb 
syndrome. 
Descartes also attempted to describe sensory and motor function.  His account of 
sensory transduction, which will be explored in greater detail in the context of sensation 
as constituting one of the four modes of thought‡ in Descartes’ theory of mind, contains 
nearly all of the features of the modern cell-based explanation whereby a physical 
stimulus is converted into a neural representation and relayed successively through a 
series of brain structures.  Descartes identified seven senses, the five external senses and 
two internal senses, one of which constitutes sensations from the viscera, such as hunger 
and thirst, and the other the passions or emotions.  Sensation corresponds to movement at 
the sensory organ being translated via Descartes’ mechanical nerve to movement of a 
corresponding brain structure; motor function corresponds to the reciprocal descending 
pathway whereby movement of a brain structure results in the movement of muscles.  In 
Descartes’ system, there is a continuity between circulation and nerve conduction, and 
the animal spirits travel from the heart to the brain, where they are separated from the 
blood and then travel through the nerves, which are “little filaments or little tubes, which 
all come from the brain19.” 
It is also worthwhile to note that Descartes’ investigation of human mental 
capacities, namely sensation, memory, and imagination, led him in 1632 to the dissection 
of sheep’s brains and the subsequent study of animal behavior9.  Descartes’ work as a 
naturalist described in Le Monde was motivated by a desire to understand human 
behavior, and in a pre-Darwinian scientific landscape, his implicit recognition that non-
humans could serve as illustrative model systems, or at least some his acknowledgement 
of some degree of mechanistic homology, suggests that he viewed non-human and human 
mental function along a continuum rather than fundamentally different. 
Some of the finer parts of Descartes’ neurophysiology begin to break down when 
concepts such as cell theory, synaptic transmission, and the blood-brain barrier are 
anachronistically layered on top of them, but again the point is not to subject Descartes’ 
science to critique by today’s standards, but rather to note four hallmark features of his 
role as a natural philosopher.  First, there is a remarkable harmony between his 
                                                     
‡ Sensation, imagination, memory, and pure intellect; discussed below in ‘A Thing that Thinks’
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descriptions of many physiological phenomena given the constraints that he was 
operating under and our present explanations for the same phenomena.  To progress from 
animal spirits to electrochemical signaling to explain nerve transmission is not the same 
type of jump as to explain replace humoral imbalance with external pathogens to explain 
disease.  Second, Descartes’ affinity for neuroscience, or whatever one would call its 
seventeenth century precursor, must remain an essential ingredient in constructing a 
composite Cartesian ideology; the increasing emphasis on metaphysics and theology in 
his later works cannot simply supplant this observation but must be considered in 
concordance with it.  Third note Descartes’ goal remains to explain as many phenomena 
as he can.  He broke with the Aristotelian tradition of simply attributing capacities to 
substantial forms; Moliere satirizes this in La Malade imaginaire, where Doctor 
Bachelierus ‘explains’ that opium makes one fall asleep because of its “dormitive 
power.?”  For Descartes, such non-explanatory restatement is grossly inadequate.  For 
now it suffices to simply highlight his explanatory goal.  Finally, the fourth critical 
feature of examining Descartes as a scientist is to highlight the dynamic nature and 
constant revision of scientific theory.  Consider Descartes’ mechanics as an example: 
motion of matter is caused by the motion of other matter.  A corollary of this requires that 
to explain action at a distance, which is readily observable, particulate matter must 
occupy all space and this precludes the existence of a vacuum§.  Let us briefly trace the 
evolution of this idea over the next four hundred years from Newtonian mechanics to 
relativity to quantum mechanics; the explanations become increasingly more precise and 
general as the scientific background changes.  Classical Newtonian mechanics is a fine 
first approximation as long as the object is not moving near the speed of light; until the 
introduction of relativity, such a phenomenon could not be otherwise explained, but 
Newtonian mechanics was an adequate temporary placeholder until the theory could be 
sufficiently refined to accommodate new data.  Descartes was well aware of this quality 
of scientific explanation, and actually explicitly acknowledges this in Le Monde.  He 
distinguishes whereby eventually a theory reaches a point where it must temporarily cede 
to theoretical constructs that it cannot in and of itself yet explain.  Noting this feature in 
regard to Cartesian science allows one to pose two questions.  First, is it possible to 
                                                     
§ Descartes actually explicitly states this in Le Monde 
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extrapolate this to Descartes’ theory of mind and suppose that mind-body dualism is a 
placeholder for aspects of human mental capacity that Descartes recognized he could not 
sufficiently explain otherwise?  Second, is there an upper limit to what can ultimately be 
explained mechanistically, a question that could not be seriously framed in Descartes’ 
time, but since the conceptual landscape has been redrawn and the rules of the game have 
changed, one is now in a position to consider? 
 
The Cogito: 
Continuing along a chronological journey through Descartes’ writings, having 
ascertained a means to establish ‘firm and lasting’ knowledge by beginning with 
hyperbolic doubt, rejecting all preconceived notions, in order to recreate the underlying 
order and certainty of mathematics in other domains, and returning from a brief 
digression through Cartesian science, we now search for a satisfactory first principle 
upon which to build everything else.  This leads to the crux of Descartes’ metaphysics, 
and perhaps of the whole unified ideology we attempt to create – the cogito argument, 
first presented in Discourse, discussed at length but not nominally in Meditations, and 
then recapitulated in Principles. 
In Discourse, after Descartes has rejected his sensory perception, reasoning, and 
his wakefulness, he arrives at the one principle he cannot cast sufficient doubt on and 
cannot reject, making the first statement of the cogito argument, 
 
“But immediately afterward I noticed that, during the time I wanted thus to think 
that everything was false, it was necessary that I, who thought thus, be something.  
And noticing that this truth – I think ,therefore I am–was so firm and so certain 
that the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were unable to shake it, I 
judged that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the 
philosophy I was seeking16.” 
 
That he was capable of, or actively engaged in, questioning the validity of these 
principles – sensory perception, reasoning, wakefulness, necessitates that some entity, i.e. 
himself, is performing this thought, and in order to do so must exist, irrespective of 
whether sensory information is reliable, subsequent reasoning is efficacious, or he is 
awake or dreaming.  This argument necessarily arises out of Descartes’ method of 
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hyperbolic doubt; the very act of doubting, which we can consider a subtype of thinking, 
forces one to acknowledge that one is doing so.  Try the mental exercise of trying to cast 
doubt on the fact that you are in fact doing so and you will readily discover “it is not 
possible for us to doubt that, while we are doubting, we exist; and that this is the first 
thing which we know by philosophizing in the correct order18.”  Moreover this is the only 
conclusion that passes the rigor of Descartes’ evaluation, 
 
“while rejecting in this way all those things which we can somehow doubt, and 
even imagining them to be false, we can indeed easily suppose that there is no 
God, no heaven, no material bodies; and even that we ourselves have no hands, or  
feet, in short, no body18.” 
 
He continues in Principles, “yet we do not on that account suppose that we, who are 
thinking such things, are nothing: for it is contradictory for us to believe that that which 
thinks, at the very time when it is thinking, does not exist18.”  The conclusion follows, 
“accordingly, this knowledge, I think, therefore I am, is the first and most certain to be 
acquired by and present itself to anyone who is philosophizing in the correct order18.” 
 In both appearances of the cogito, note the appearance of temporally qualifying 
phrases that link the argument to the present.  In Discourse, ‘during the time I wanted 
thus to think that everything was false,’ and in Principles, ‘that which thinks, at the very 
time when it is thinking.’  The cogito does not say I think, therefore I was or will be, but I 
am, and extrapolation beyond the instant in which one is thinking, a precondition for 
concluding the immortality of the soul, is not inherent in this argument. 
 The other characteristic feature of the development of this argument is its utter 
logical simplicity and apparent necessity, as the mental exercise of trying to recreate it 
reveals.  Descartes attempts to entertain the contrapositive, “on the other hand, had I 
simply stopped thinking… …I would have no reason to believe that I existed10;” the 
conclusion is the same and equally self-evident.  While he accepts the cogito as a first 
principle because it is the only thing remaining after hyperbolic doubt, “doubtless I did 
exist, if I persuaded myself of something10,” Descartes uses a different feature of the 
argument to subsequently extrapolate it.  He notices that “this truth – I think, therefore I 
am–was so firm and so certain that the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics were 
unable to shake it18,” and therefore concludes that “things we conceive very clearly and 
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very distinctly are all true18.”  One could dwell on the apparent non-sequitor here, but for 
us it suffices to simply note that Descartes supposes truth from clarity and distinctness. 
 The final task in explicating the cogito proper is to qualify the ‘I’ that Descartes’ 
refers to at this stage in the argument.  “We ourselves have no hands, or feet, in short, no 
body, yet we do not on that account suppose that we, who are thinking such things, are 
nothing18.”  The very conditions that allow the cogito to emerge prevent one from 
positively affirming the existence of a corporeal body.  Descartes breaks the logical 
progression down in Meditations.  First, “thought exists, it alone cannot be separated 
from me;” and it follows that “I am; I exist – this is certain.”  Unifying these two, “I am 
therefore precisely nothing but a thinking thing17,” which, “in order to exist, needed no 
place and depended on no material thing16.”  From this perspective, the mind-body 
duality that emerges out of the cogito, is a logical consequence, and this author proposes 
to some extent an artifact, resulting from a necessary concession that the cogito makes in 
order to achieve its absolute certainty.  Descartes never intends to permanently cast doubt 
on the reality of corporeal bodies, and in fact he acknowledges the “commingling of the 
mind and body17” even at this early stage in the development of the argument.  Similarly, 
this author maintains that the mind-body duality and accusation of substance dualism is 
overemphasized because Descartes fails to reconstitute the self as an essential entity, or 
ens per se, consisting of the essential union of the res cogitans established by the cogito 
and the res extensa, or body, with the same certitude with which he distinguishes them, a 
difficulty he was undoubtedly aware of – “it is necessary to conceive [mind and body] as 
a single thing and at the same time to conceive them as two things; and this is absurd9.”
 
Mind-Body Dualism: 
 Regardless of the extent to which Descartes ultimately advocates this view, the 
immediate consequence of the cogito is a fundamental distinction between the mind, or 
alternatively the thinking self whose existence is affirmed by the cogito, or soul, and the 
body, or extended self.  We entertain this distinction proper as it emerges from the 
Cartesian texts before progressing to the residual question that restricts the domain of the 
latter and deals solely with a mind-brain duality.  Essentially the direct implication from 
the cogito is that what can be absolutely affirmed to exist is a ‘thinking thing,’ because its 
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existence is guaranteed by the undeniable observation that it is in fact thinking.  This 
sounds remarkably like the scholastic notion of non-explanatory substantial forms, which 
we have already depicted Descartes as explicitly rejecting.  The traditional argument 
takes from the cogito that “I am therefore precisely nothing but a thinking thing17” which, 
“in order to exist, needed no place and depended on no material thing16,” and identifies 
the mind as a substance defined** by thought, and in contrast to the body,  
 
“all that is capable of being bounded by some shape, of being enclosed in a place, 
and of filling up a space in such a way as to exclude any other body from it; of 
being perceived by touch, sight, hearing, taste, or smell; of being moved in 
several ways, not of course, by itself, but by whatever else impinges on it17,” 
 
defined by extension.  Descartes repeats this delineation in Principles, “extension, or 
figure, or local motion (or any similar thing which must be attributed to a body) does not 
belong to our nature18,” where at this juncture ‘our’ refers to the mind or ‘thinking self’ 
of the cogito.  Even Clarke, the most dogged critic of attributing substance dualism to 
Descartes concedes that “some mental properties are not reducible to the properties of 
Cartesian matter9.”  While a preliminary distinction is real, its overemphasis gives way to 
the two-worlds view that Baker and Morris criticize4, relegating the mind and body to 
separate independent spheres because of their different natures.  A preview of the 
implication of this two-worlds view is that mind and body necessarily operate wholly 
independently, and an attempt to reconcile this with Descartes’ subsequent insistence of 
their interaction forces one to choose between causal dualism, whereby “mental states 
and states of the body are logically independent but causally interrelated: causal 
interaction is, as it were, the glue bonding mind to body in each individual person4” or 
occasionalism, in which “these two streams of events are kept marching in step by God’s 
constant interventions4.”  The former violates Cartesian physics by requiring that a non-
corporeal entity, the mind, causes the motion of matter, i.e. the body, whereas the latter 
                                                     
** ‘Defined’ is intended to signify that the property that follows (here thought, subsequently for 
body, extension), refers to the essential nature of the substance being discussed in a Scholastic 
fashion; i.e., thought is the single defining property which makes the mind a mind.  Too much 
emphasis is not made to define all of the Scholastic concepts involved – substance, mode, form, 
because a detailed discussion of this is peripheral to the present discussion, but a more detailed 
account can be found in Chapter 8 of Clarke, Chapter 5 of Baker & Morris, and throughout 
Sepper. 
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merely displaces the burden of explanation.  To this author neither is satisfactory, and 
therefore the premise that prompted the either/or dilemma is resubmitted to examination. 
 Aside from these two different natures or essences that render mind and body 
fundamentally different, the other distinction that emerges directly from the cogito is the 
different quality of one’s understanding of their existence.  In Discourse Descartes claims 
“I could pretend that I had no body and that there was no world nor any place where I 
was, but that I could not pretend, on that account, that I did not exist16.”  He continues, 
“this “I,” that is, the soul through which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the 
body, and is even easier to know than the body, and even if there were no body, the soul 
would not cease to be all that it is16.”  Three features prove striking about this second 
claim.  It is the first point at which Descartes equates the res cogitans with the soul.  His 
claim that the soul is ‘even easier to know than the body’ echoes his conviction that 
“things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true18.”  Finally the last part 
of this passage does not necessitate the immortality of the soul, but only its independence 
from the body. 
 Before considering the nature of their interaction, one must attempt to understand 
the logical relationship between the self/soul/mind/res cogitans, the corporeal physical 
body/res extensa, and their composition, if the latter can be said to exist.  Isolation of the 
mind as an independent entity has already been satisfactorily addressed.  Descartes makes 
the same explicit claim for the body. 
 
“I also acknowledge that there are other faculties, such as those of moving from 
one place to another, of taking on various shapes, and so on, that, like sensing or 
imagining, cannot be understood apart from some substance in which they inhere, 
and hence without which they cannot exist17” 
 
We omit tracing his proof of the existence of corporeal bodies, and instead return to 
Descartes’ earlier challenge to form “a very distinct conception of both the distinction 
between the soul and the body and their union9.”  In What Am I? Joseph Almog attempts 
to logically prove this simultaneous distinction and union3.  He defines DM, Descartes’ 
mind; DB, Descartes’ body; and RD, Rene Descartes, the composite entity.  The proof of 
distinction operates on conceivability and numerical distinction; DB has property x; DM 
does not, therefore DB ≠ DM.  The proof of independence is even more vacuous, and 
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though logically sound, its practicability is not particularly satisfying to this author, who 
retains Descartes’ view that “to conceive them as a single thing and at the same time to 
conceive them as two things is absurd9.”  The usefulness of Almog’s discussion is that he 
elegantly articulates the logical relationship between these entities, that RD consists of 
the union of DM and DB, that DB and DM are independent of each other, and both are 
contingent but not wholly dependent on RD. 
 Another fundamental difference used to demarcate the realms of mind and body is 
the question of their divisibility.  A body, being composed of particulate matter, is 
inherently divisible.  Descartes maintains “on the other hand, the mind is utterly 
indivisible17.”  The faculties of the mind, “willing, sensing, understanding, and so on” 
cannot “be called ‘parts’ of the mind, since it is one and the same mind that wills, senses, 
and understands17.”  For Descartes “this consideration alone would suffice to teach [him] 
that the mind is wholly diverse from the body17.”  Should we succeed in attributing these 
faculties of the mind, willing, sensing, and understanding, to the physical brain, and 
identifying a spatial locus for each of them via lesion studies or neuroimaging, this claim 
would evaporate. 
 The final means for delineating between mind and body is a division of labor of 
sorts.  In the above passage Descartes assigns to the mind the functions of willing, 
sensing, and understanding.  The faculty of sensing remains to be qualified, as this is a 
faculty shared by the Cartesian mind and body, albeit in different capacities.  However 
Descartes has quite precisely assigned nearly every conceivable mental†† capacity to 
either the mind or the physical brain.  This is best represented 
                                                     
†† We now transition into specifically considering the brain and its distinction from the mind rather 
than the whole body.  Obviously physical functions concerning the entire body proper are not 
conceivable to consider attributing to the mind; the mind does not walk (though we do include 
control of locomotion) 
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graphically:
 
Body (brain) Mind (soul) 
This representation attempts to integrate the various descriptions of Descartes’ 
assignment of different mental faculties to either the soul or the body.  In Passions, he 
claims “there is no better path for arriving at an understanding of our Passions than to 
examine the difference between the soul and the body, in order to understand to which of 
the two each of the functions within us should be attributed19.”  The organization of his 
division scheme is sensation, imagination, and memory are variations of the same 
essential process which differ only in their input.  These are faculties shared with non-
human animals and therefore necessarily assigned to the body.  Understanding, or pure 
intellect, represents an increasing degree of abstraction of any of these three processes, 
which Descartes assigns to the soul.  Together these four comprise ‘thought’ or cogitatio.  
The two functions he ascribes wholly to the soul are volitions, or actions of the will, and 
passions, which essentially are emotions, though in Passions he allows that the soul is 
informed by the body with regard to these passions, and they may have their terminus in 
either the soul or the body.  Despite these ambiguities and some inconsistency between 
different texts or different passages within the same text, Descartes does attempt to 
circumscribe the functions of the soul and the body. 
Imagination Sensation Memory Volitions Passions 
Understanding 
(pure intellect) 
Hendriksen 19 
‘A Thing that Thinks’: 
 The cogito establishes Descartes, or any man for that matter, as a thinking thing.  
He questions, “but what then am I?  A thing that thinks.  What is that?  A thing that 
doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and also that imagines and senses4,” 
attempting to provide a comprehensive definition for cogitatio.  Let us examine this 
definition in order to identify what exactly constitutes Cartesian thought.  The first, 
doubt, is necessarily included because it was the means by which we arrived at this 
conclusion in the first place.  Understanding we will loosely equate with awareness, 
conscious perception, and the highest degree of abstraction of other modes of thinking, 
i.e. the pure intellect that Descartes ascribes to the soul.  Affirmation and denial and 
willing and refusal represent pairs of opposites that relate to the volitions, again a 
function of the soul.  Imagination and sensation however, are explicitly assigned to the 
body17, and here are undeniably included in a definition of thought.  [“Sensing,] is 
nothing other than thinking” and the “power of imagining depends on something distinct 
from me17,” i.e. a body.  Contrast this account from Meditations with that in Principles, 
where “there are only two modes of thinking in us; that is, the perception of the intellect 
and the operation of the will18.”  Cartesian thought can then be taken to include sensation, 
imagination, memory, pure intellect, and operation of the will, where the first three of 
these are faculties of the body, the fourth comprises perception of any of the first three by 
the soul, and the fifth is an exclusive function of the soul. 
 We now consider each of these in turn.  Sensation will be elaborated on at 
length‡‡, but is included here for completeness and clarity.  Essentially the Cartesian 
account of sensation corresponds to detection of physical stimuli, and interpretation and 
integration by the brain of features that really exist in the external world.  This also 
includes the two internal senses; the commonality is the correspondence to corporeal 
reality and transduction via a physical sense organ.  Baker and Morris make the useful 
distinction between bodily sensation, which they denote with a one subscript, seeing1, 
and what they term rational, restricted sensation, which Descartes assigns to the soul, 
alternatively the conscious perception or judgment of sensing something, denoted by a 
two subscript, seeing24. 
                                                     
‡‡ In Sensation and Sensory Phenomena below 
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“The same cognitive power [involved in sensation] can also be applied to images 
stored in the brain; when performing this function, it is called ‘memory.’  Finally , 
if it becomes creative and causes the occurrence of new brain patterns, it is called 
‘imagination’ when it depends on previously stored images, and ‘pure intellect’ 
when it acts independently of perceptions or impressions9.” 
 
Clarke’s paraphrase is particularly elegant because it distinguishes each capacity 
according to its object, but the original is essentially the same, “the same power therefore 
is called ‘pure intellect,’ ‘imagination,’ ‘memory’ or ‘sensation,’ depending on its 
different operations9.”  Imagination, thus, is analogous to sensation except that the 
objects that the brain operates on are not readily available to the sense organs and some 
amount of creativity is permissible.  One can imagine, for instance, an object previously 
perceived by the senses but not at the moment present in the environment; imagine an 
apple.  Similarly, the imagination is used in constructing composite realities that escape 
the necessary temporal constraints of the senses, a song from notes separated in time.  
One can imagine a griffin by fusing the separate images of a lion and an eagle.  The 
imagination also allows for a certain degree of abstraction, but is restricted by its ultimate 
dependence on prior sensory exposure.  For example, one can readily imagine a triangle, 
but cannot imagine a chiliagon, a thousand-sided figure9.  While such a figure can 
certainly exist and is conceivable, one cannot form an image of it that can be easily 
distinguished from say a nine-hundred-ninety-nine sided figure.  Clarke maintains that 
the imagination limits intellectual abstraction to what is conceivable, though in this case 
the constraint is simply the capacity to form an image9.  Sepper notes that in Descartes’ 
earlier works, the imagination, or phantasia, is the theoretical precursor to what 
eventually becomes the intellect39.  Even here, the only difference is a gradation of the 
degree of permitted abstraction, hardly the distinction that demands fundamentally 
different domains.  This shared mechanism and seemingly fluid boundaries between 
separate mental capacities that are on the one hand rigidly assigned to either body or 
mind should ultimately provide us with enough confidence to localize them all entirely to 
the brain and eliminate the need to hypothesize a non-corporeal mind. 
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 Descartes deals with memory in much the same way.  Whereas imagination can 
use prior sensory exposure in a creative fashion, memory operates on ‘images stored in 
the brain.’  Consider Descartes’ explanation of memory, 
 
“imagine that after issuing from gland H spirits pass through tubes 2, 4, 6 and the 
like, into the pores or gaps lying between the tiny fibres making up part B of the 
brain.  And suppose that the spirits are strong enough to enlarge these gaps a little, 
and to bend and arrange any fibres they encounter in various ways, depending on 
the different ways in which the spirits are moving and the different openings of 
the tubes into which they pass.  And they do this in such a way that they also trace 
figures in these gaps, corresponding to those of the objects.  At first they do this 
less easily and perfectly here than on gland H, but they gradually improve as their 
action becomes stronger and lasts longer, or is repeated more often.  Which is 
why in such cases these patterns are no longer easily erased, but are preserved in 
such a way that the ideas that were previously on this gland can be formed again 
long afterwards without requiring the presence of the objects to which they 
correspond.  And this is what memory consists in39.” 
 
Descartes explanation identifies memory as the disposition of animal spirits to repeat a 
particular trace that they have already performed due to changes in the network resulting 
from continued activation of this trace.  While physical deformation of the fibers has 
since been replaced by NMDA receptors, Descartes identification of a particular brain 
trace rather than a locus precludes the need to hypothesize an engram, and is remarkably 
consistent with our present understanding of memory.  Similarly, in Passions, “these 
traces are nothing but this: the pores of the brain through which the spirits have 
previously made their way because of the presence of this object19.”  Like sensation and 
imagination, memory is explained mechanistically entirely in terms of the physiological 
brain.  Descartes does make room for a capacity called intellectual memory, apparently a 
function of the soul, but Clarke makes a convincing case that this appears as an 
afterthought appended to a discussion of body-based memory, and it is only 
acknowledged but not explained in response to the question of whether in the afterlife 
one is capable of remembering experiences during his or her lifetime9. 
 The final mode of this cognitive power is pure intellect, ‘which acts 
independently of perceptions or impressions.’  Pure intellect or pure understanding is 
conscious thought independent of a corresponding stimulus or image.  Consider the 
example of the triangle versus the chiliagon; the former uses the imagination, the latter 
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pure intellect.  Clarke argues that ‘pure’ refers to thought that is completely within ones 
own control as a thinking being and not constrained by the realities of sensation, 
imagination, or memory9.  He maintains that this independence characterizes pure 
intellect in contrast to other forms of thought.  Moreover he adds that this only requires 
separation from the physiological brain when substance dualism is read anachronistically 
into the argument; Descartes’ discussion of pure intellect preceded the cogito by nearly 
twenty years.  While he does assign pure intellect to the soul, the continuity between this 
capacity and the others should cast further doubt on a fundamental distinction that 
requires this. 
 
Sensation: 
 Sensation is perhaps the most interesting form of thought that Descartes describes.  
On the one hand, “[sensing,] precisely so taken is nothing other than thinking17” and on 
the other it “surely does not take place without a body17.”  Using vision as an example, 
we consider again Baker and Morris’ distinction between seeing1 and seeing2.  The 
former refers to the physical, anatomically-dependent act of transducing a visual stimulus 
from the environment to a brain pattern.  The latter describes the conscious perception of 
seeing, which Baker and Morris maintain that according to Descartes’ account, precisely 
involves making a judgment, an action of the soul, that one is seeing1 something.  Thus 
the statement ‘I see2 light’ is logically equivalent to ‘I judge that I see1 light.’  A parallel 
feature of the cogito emerges here; while one can be mistaken in the statement ‘I see1 
light,’ the sincere assertion that ‘I see2 light’ is necessarily true.  Moreover, seeing1 does 
not necessitate seeing2, as in blindsight§§, and seeing2 does not necessitate seeing1, as in 
visual hallucinations. 
 The contrasting accounts create a complex picture.  Descartes insists that “I could 
not sense any object unless it was present to a sense organ.  Nor could I fail to sense it 
when it was present17,” grounding the senses in the physical world and localizing them to 
the anatomical brain, but he by no means here insists on their infallibility.  In fact, he 
maintains that our senses readily deceive us, such as in perceiving towers in the distance 
as round when they are in fact square.  This applies equally to the internal senses; he 
                                                     
§§ Blindsight is discussed at length below. 
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discusses phantom limb syndrome and notes that someone with dropsy will feel thirsty 
when in fact water will be harmful to them.  This final example is less robust, because the 
physical sensation of thirst is no different, merely the question of its contribution to 
welfare, which Descartes identifies as the purpose of our senses.  The other side of this 
account is a return to the primacy of sensation2; “what I thought I had seen with my eyes, 
I actually grasped solely with the faculty of judgment, which is in my mind17.”  The 
distinction Descartes makes between sensing1 and sensing2 is important and certainly still 
relevant, and is perhaps equivalent to the modern distinction between sensation and 
(conscious) perception.  What the author questions is whether there is a discrete boundary 
that necessitates fundamental separation or whether like the other faculties surveyed thus 
far, these phenomena range along a continuum and four hundred years of brain science 
have allowed us license to revise Descartes’ division and eliminate the need to 
hypothesize a non-physical entity responsible for the highest levels of processing.  
Descartes offers as an example our perception of a star versus a torch17, and notes that 
“there is no real or positive tendency in my eye toward believing that the star is no larger 
than the flame17.”  For Descartes, this judgment, is ‘perceived through the mind alone,’ 
though we have now located mechanisms for interpreting size in relation to distance early 
in the visual pathway. 
 Descartes suggests that the highest levels of processing are faculties of the soul.  
Using vision as a representative example, we consider his tentative pathway beginning 
with transduction to attempt to ascertain precisely where the soul takes over from the 
physiological brain.  He understands the general principle of transduction, likening the 
action of physical stimuli on the sense organs to “the same way as wax receives an 
impression from a seal9.”  Descartes likely did not realize this, but the analogy of 
temporary reversible physical distortion corresponds directly to bleaching of 
photoreceptors, vibration of the basilar membrane, activation of taste and olfactory 
receptors, or bending of mechanoreceptors.  With regard to the visual system, “objects of 
vision are communicated to us by the mediation of transparent bodies between them and 
us19;” Descartes is effectively talking about photons here.  These ‘transparent bodies’ 
then “locally move the little filaments of the optic nerves at the back of our eyes19.”  The 
‘little filaments’ that he discusses have already been identified as nerves, and thus 
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Descartes observes that a physical stimulus is converted into a neural signal.  More 
generally, “[all of the senses] excite some movement in our nerves, which passes to the 
brain by means of them19.”
 The sensory nerves then move “the parts of the brain these nerves come from19;” 
i.e. there are structures in the brain that receive the sensory input.  Continuing Descartes’ 
account from Passions, “they move them in as many different ways as there are 
diversities they make us see in things, and that it is not the movements occurring in the 
eye, but those occurring in the brain, that immediately represent those objects to the 
soul19.”  From this one can glean that he understands a sequential relay and 
physiologically based cognitive processing of sensory information.  An earlier account 
from Rule 12 in Regulae follows a slightly different path; impressions received by the 
sense organs are conducted to the sensus communis or ‘common sense’ then to the 
phantasia or imagination, and then finally to the vis cognoscens or “the force through 
which we properly know things20,” only the latter of which is not physically grounded.  
Merging these two accounts, Descartes’ ‘common sense’ can be surmised as a precursor 
to the thalamus; in his pathway it integrates sensory information but precedes conscious 
perception.  As presented here, Descartes’ account does not seem to necessitate that one 
attribute conscious perception entirely to the non-corporeal soul; he explicitly affirms a 
physiological locus for the phantasia. 
 While Descartes’ sensory pathways do ultimately converge on the soul; “these 
various movements of the brain make our soul have various sensations19;” he also notes a 
purely bodily pathway whereby “they can also, apart from the soul, make the spirits take 
their course toward certain muscles rather than others, and so make them move our 
members19.”  This allows for several interpretations ranging from a simple reflex to 
something analogous to the retinotectal projection (whereby visual information bypasses 
primary visual cortex and we are not explicitly aware of seeing something but can still 
respond to it) to the supposition that consciousness does not require the extra-body soul.  
The author prefers the third but does not insist that readers subscribe to a particular 
interpretation of this feature. 
 The final critical feature of Descartes account of sensation is that he recognizes 
the brain’s encoding of sensory information.  He describes a one-to-one correspondence 
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but non-resemblance between external stimuli and brain patterns9.  Descartes describes 
this phenomena in Regulae and Le Monde, drawing an analogy between words and the 
objects that they represent.  Non-resemblance is critical here; in his work on the visual 
system, The Dioptrics, Descartes maintains that the image on the retina is not identical to 
that in the external world, “as if there were yet other eyes in our brain which we could 
perceive it9.”  Descartes’ early recognition and emphasis on this feature of sensory 
perception carries several implications.  First of all it underscores the extent of his 
scientific understanding.  Moreover, this preempts and diffuses later attacks on the 
Cartesian account such as Ryle’s ‘ghost in the machine’ and Anthony Kenny’s accusation 
of a homunculus fallacy, whereby Descartes’ apparent dualism is analogous to Aristotle’s 
non-explanatory restatement, the most obvious implication of which is that it implies an 
infinite regress. 
 
Functions of the Soul: 
 While on the one hand Descartes undoubtedly makes claims to a necessary 
separation of the mind and body and some form of dualism, there is a parallel current of 
increasing physiological explanation and ambiguity between the functions of soul and the 
brain.  As one hones in on this boundary from different perspectives, the theme that 
should emerge is that Descartes attributes to the soul the most abstract and complex 
degrees of particular functions, thus far all of which in their simpler more concrete forms, 
are explained physiologically.  Having illustrated this, we now investigate what, 
according to Descartes, belongs exclusively to the domain of the soul or mind. 
 There are three such functions that Descartes seems to attribute solely to the mind.  
In Article 17 of Passions, he states that  
 
“having thus taken into consideration all the functions that belong to the body 
alone, it is easy to understand that there remains nothing in us that we should 
attribute to our soul but our thoughts, which are principally of two genera – the 
first, namely, are the actions of the soul; the others are its passions19.” 
 
The so-called ‘actions of the soul’ are alternatively referred to as volitions, “come 
directly from our soul and seem to depend only on it19;” this is the will.  The ‘passions of 
the soul’ are “all the sorts of cases of perception or knowledge to be found in us19.”  In 
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Article 27 Descartes explicitly defines ‘passions of the soul’ as “perceptions or sensations 
or excitations of the soul which are referred to it in particular and which are caused, 
maintained, and strengthened by some movement of the spirits19.”  From this general 
definition, Descartes then variously classifies and organizes the passions, and eventually 
identifies a subclass of which there are six fundamental passions, wonder, love, hatred, 
desire, joy, and sadness, which he discusses at length, and the latter part of Passions 
reads like a theory of emotion or temperament.  Thus the author divides Descartes’ notion 
of passions into two distinct concepts, self-awareness or conscientia in general and the 
specific passions that Descartes enumerates and their products which appear to 
correspond to emotional responses.  These, in addition to the volitions, comprise the 
entirety of the functions which can be attributed exclusively to the soul. 
 Self awareness, or conscientia is exemplified by the previous example of 
sensation with the two subscript.  One can expand this beyond sensation and identify 
conscientia as the awareness of, or judgment that one is, performing a particular faculty 
of the body.  To walk2 makes as much sense as to see2 and is not necessarily equivalent to 
walking1.  Essentially this faculty can be described as self-knowledge or reflective 
knowledge.  Baker and Morris note this as a restricted case of infallibility, i.e. that “a 
person cannot be mistaken in his own (sincere) judgments that he has particular 
‘perceptions’ or that he makes/has made particular judgments4.”  The judgment itself can 
be misinformed, but the second order judgment, or the judgment that one is judging thus, 
is necessarily correct.  This function of the soul seems to be wholly included under our 
present understanding of consciousness, by no means a trivial component of human 
mental capacity, but one that is identified entirely with the physiological brain, namely, 
the cerebral cortex. 
 Descartes’ more limited discussion of ‘the passions of the soul’ identifies their 
principle effect as to “incite and dispose their soul to will the things for which they 
prepare their body19,” or alternatively to “dispose the soul to will the things nature tells us 
are useful and to persist in this volition19.”  Descartes identifies a subclass of passions 
caused by the soul “which decide to conceive of this or that object19;” this seems to 
correspond to the conscientia described above.  The remainder of the passions however, 
are caused by “the temperament of the body alone or by impressions haphazardly 
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encountered in the brain… …excited as well by objects which move the senses19.”  Thus 
the passions originate in the body, convey a particular sense to the soul, which effects or 
modulates a particular volition, which is then reflected back to the body resulting in an 
action; in Clarke, ”their natural function is to stimulate the soul to consent and contribute 
to actions that can help to protect the body or make it more perfect in some way9.”  Since 
both the origin and terminus is in the body, this prompts the question of the particular 
role of the soul in this system and whether it can be regarded as a superfluous shunt.  
There is an implicit suggestion of this in Descartes; “These movements that are produced 
in the blood by the objects of the passions follow so promptly solely from the 
impressions made in the brain and the disposition of the organs, even though the soul 
contributes nothing at all to them19.”  This author is in agreement with Clarke’s 
conclusion that this suggests that “this naturally instituted coordination between our 
sensations, the passions they generate, and the relevant behavioural response can operate 
without any intervention of the soul or mind9.”  Rather, here the soul is superimposed on 
an otherwise autonomous system whereby sensations exact actions as a black box for 
which Descartes deems the science of his time unable to satisfactorily account for. 
 The final function that Descartes ascribes to the soul is this second genera of our 
thoughts, which he alternately calls ‘the actions of the soul, ‘our volitions,’ and ‘the will,’ 
which in contrast to the passions, “come directly from our soul and seem to depend only 
on it19.”  In the next article he distinguishes between volitions that terminate in the soul, 
the example he offers is to will to love God, and those that terminate in the body, for 
instance, to have the volition to walk.  Clarke defines Descartes’ will as the “distinctive 
power or ability that human agents have and in virtue of which some of their actions are 
subject to moral evaluation9.”  This carries two features which prevent us from simply 
identifying the will as the capacity to initiate voluntary action and relegating it to the 
prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia, thus effectively entirely dismantling Descartes’ soul.  
First, Descartes maintains that the will is uniquely human, and second, this is the first 
appearance in our discussion of consideration of morality.  However the motif continues 
here; consider this account of the will from The Description of the Human Body, 
 
“the soul can cause no movement in the body unless all the corporeal organs 
required for that movement are properly disposed.  Besides, when the body has all 
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the organs disposed for this movement, it does not need the soul to produce it.  
Consequently all those movements that we do not experience as depending on our 
thought must not be attributed to the soul but only to the disposition of our 
organs; and even those movements that are called ‘voluntary’ proceed principally 
from this disposition of the organs, for they cannot have been produced without it, 
no matter how much we will it20.” 
 
Descartes seems to assert here that the ‘disposition of the organs’ is necessary and 
sufficient for at least those volitions that have their terminus in the body.  Two caveats 
remain – this says nothing about the class of volitions that terminate in the soul, and also, 
this passage is immediately followed by the ambiguous phrase “even though it is the soul 
that determines them20.” 
 Thus Descartes presents three functions of the soul, self-knowledge or 
consciousness of one’s thoughts and actions; translation of sensory or other bodily-
derived stimuli into volitions; and finally volitions or willing to perform particular 
thoughts or actions.  For each of these, we have painted a picture where in Descartes’ 
grand scheme the function belongs exclusively to the soul, but as each is considered in 
detail, contradictory or at least ambiguous accounts of bodily autonomy and dependence 
on the soul are both asserted and the boundary becomes increasingly abstruse.  Like 
picking up a jellyfish, the brilliance and clarity vanishes when one removes it from the 
water.  The author does not attribute this feature to Descartes being deliberately esoteric 
or proposing an ill-informed theory, but rather maintains that his theory of mind was a 
work in progress up until his death and that much of the apparent ambiguity that we have 
identified corresponds to placeholders as he sought increasingly better explanations. 
 
‘The Little Gland’: 
 That we have identified individual processes that jointly involve the body and the 
soul appears to require an interaction of some sort between these two entities.  This claim 
is made here as general as possible; the term ‘interaction’ is not intended to presuppose 
any of the rigidity variously associated with the philosophy of mind concepts of 
‘interactionism’ or ‘causal dualism,’ but simply to denote the observation that the actions 
and passions of the soul are conveyed to and from the body.  Descartes readily concedes 
this; identifying the “power of the soul to move the body and the power of the body to act 
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on the soul4.”  This forces us to confront three questions concerning the quality, locus, 
and mechanism of this interaction.  The soul by definition lacks extension, whereas the 
body is precisely defined by it, and the interaction between these two presents a 
philosophical problem that the present investigation does not intend to delve further into 
but merely points out for completion. 
 While “the soul is truly joined to the whole body, and that one cannot properly 
say that it is in any one of its parts to the exclusion of the others19,” Descartes readily 
assigns a physiological locus for the interaction between body and soul, 
 
“the part of the body in which the soul immediately exercises its functions is in no 
way the heart; it is not the whole brain either, but only the innermost of its parts – 
a certain extremely small gland, situated in the middle of its substances, and so 
suspended above the duct by which the spirits of its anterior cavities are in 
communication with those of the posterior that its slightest movements can 
greatly alter the course of these spirits, and conversely the slightest changes 
taking place in the course of the spirits can greatly alter the movements of this 
gland19.” 
 
In Passions Descartes explains his reasoning for choosing the pineal gland as the 
‘principal seat of the soul.’  He identifies it as the only unpaired structure in the brain, in 
contrast with the hemispheres, the thalamus, and the sensory organs, and concludes that 
“inasmuch as we only have a single and simple thought of a given thing at a given time, 
there must necessarily be some place where the two images… …can coalesce into one 
before they reach the soul19.”  Moreover Descartes incorrectly notes that this gland is 
unique to humans.  Interestingly, modern pineal physiology may have caused Descartes 
to more readily affirm its role as the seat of the soul than to discount it.  The pineal gland 
has now been identified as primarily responsible for producing melatonin, a hormone 
involved in regulating Circadian rhythms in response to photoperiod.  Perhaps more 
interesting, the pineal gland shares developmental origin with the retina and is also not 
isolated from the circulation via the blood-brain barrier like much of the brain, rendering 
it capable of interacting with Descartes’ animal spirits. 
 In an extension of Descartes’ mechanical model of nerve transmission, 
communication between the pineal gland and the rest of the body is achieved by 
movement.  Movements of the pineal gland direct the animal spirits in a particular way, 
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and the “animal spirits enter the muscles differentially, whereby they can move the 
members in all the different ways in which they are capable of being moved19;” 
essentially movement of the pineal gland is appended to Descartes’ existing motor system 
as the most upstream component.  Sensory perceptions are conveyed to the pineal gland 
in a precisely analogous fashion; transduction of sensory stimuli pulls the nerves 
filaments in a particular way which results in particular motion of the animal spirits and 
then the pineal gland, “which can be moved by them in as many different ways as there 
are differences capable of being sensed in objects19.”  While this mechanism explains 
how movements of the pineal gland correspond to sensory and motor function, i.e. “by 
the mediation of spirits, nerves, and even blood,” the pineal gland is not the soul, but far 
enough downstream that it is a physical entity, and thus this attempted explanation is in 
fact non-explanatory.  This is best summarized in a letter from Princess Elizabeth of 
Bohemia to Descartes, with whom he corresponded with at length about the implications 
of his mind-body dualism.  Elizabeth writes, 
 
How can the human soul, which is only a thinking substance, determine the 
movement of the animal spirits in order to perform a voluntary action?  It seems 
as if every determination of movement results from the following three factors: 
the pushing of the thing that is moved, the manner in which it is pushed by the 
body that moves it, and the quality and shape of the latter’s surface.  The first two 
presuppose that the bodies touch, while the third presupposes extension.  You 
exclude extension completely from your concept of the soul and, it seems to me, it 
is incompatible with being an immaterial thing.  That is why I am asking for a 
more specific definition of the soul than what is provided in your 
Metaphysics, that is, of the substance of the soul when it is separated from its 
action of thinking9.” 
  
This interaction between the non-corporeal soul and the physical body, of which 
the pineal gland is an intermediary, is Descartes’ black box;*** he has no satisfactory 
answer for Elizabeth’s question.  In Cartesian Dualism, which this author joins Baker and 
Morris in labeling a misrepresentation of Descartes, “thoughts and state of the body are 
logically independent but causally interrelated4.”  They point out in their introduction that 
                                                     
*** The term is borrowed from biochemist Michael Behe in his controversial work Darwin’s Black 
Box6 where he questions evolution from a biochemical perspective.  Behe uses the term to refer 
to a subdiscipline that cannot be adequately explained at present, for instance, the cell.  While the 
input and output may be understood, the inner workings of the black box are mysterious until it 
can be opened and its contents explored.  The author feels they analogy is valid here. 
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“it is notorious that Descartes could give no defensible account of how these causal 
interactions take place4,” and the proposition is that this is the ceiling of Descartes’ 
capability to explain human mental capacity, and represents the black box in his theory, 
to be opened when the intellectual and scientific background changed sufficiently to 
allow it.  Skipping momentarily to the conclusion, inside the black box, we find 
Descartes’ mind or soul is a complex network of a hundred billion neurons and their 
various connections, continuously firing, changing, and being modulated to constitute our 
mental world.  Further, within this black box are smaller black boxes that remain to be 
explored.  For now though, we return to the nature of this interaction as Descartes 
understood it by his death in 1650, not to demonstrate it as incorrect, but as incomplete 
and unsatisfactory. 
 From Passions, “merely by willing something [the soul] makes the little gland to 
which it is closely joined move in the way required to produce the effect corresponding to 
this volition19.”  This correspondence has no causal component; “these two streams of 
events are kept marching in step by God’s constant interventions4.”  Such an assertion 
seems to call into question whether there is even an interaction.  Further, in analogy to the 
non-resemblance between an object in the visual field and its representation on the retina 
or to an object and the word used to signify it, there is no intrinsic commonality between 
the movement of the pineal gland and the thought in the soul.  Rather,  
 
“A particular movement of the pineal gland would not be the movement it is if it 
were not tied to the particular thought which it in fact occasions the soul to have, 
and a particular volition (of the sort which terminates in an action of the body) 
would not be the volition it is if it were not tied to the particular movement of the 
pineal gland which is in fact occasioned by it4.” 
 
Correlation between thought and movement of the pineal gland is arbitrary, 
unintelligible, and necessary.  The common feature of these two properties, non-causation 
and non-resemblance, is that they highlight the theocentric aspect of Descartes’ 
explanation of the interaction between mind and body.  The strict correlation between a 
particular thought and the movement of the pineal gland that corresponds to it and effects 
a particular brain pattern characterized by motion of animal spirits, is ‘ordained by God’ 
to ensure and maintain our welfare, and thus could be no other way.  It is appropriate that 
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the physical property of absence of nutrients should be transduced to the brain, perceived 
as the passion of hunger, move the pineal gland in precisely the appropriate way to 
dispose the soul to have the volition to eat, that this volition should then incite the motion 
of the pineal gland that corresponds to inducing feeding behavior, and then that this 
movement results in the movement of animal spirits that direct the muscles to obtain and 
ingest food. 
 In describing this interaction, Descartes refers frequently to ‘our Nature as the 
union of mind and body’ and describes this union as an ‘ens per se,’ or essential entity 
rather than an ‘ens per accidens,’ or accidental entity.  The former phrase emphasizes this 
property of being ordained by God, hence Baker and Morris use a capital ‘N’ to highlight 
this feature in contrast to a simply inherent property or disposition that ‘nature’ would 
suggest.  The identification of the Nature of the entity of the mind-body union as 
essential rather than accidental reinforces this, and Descartes’ use of the two phrases 
attempts to answer, at least from a theological perspective, his self-proclaimed absurd 
challenge to conceive of the mind and body as simultaneously distinct and united.†††
 
On New Foundations: 
 Up to this point the question of Descartes’ theology has largely been avoided, and 
the author does not intend to delve too deeply into his particular religious beliefs.  
Descartes was a self-professed believer and a practicing Catholic, though his works were 
placed on the index and there have been various charges questioning his orthodoxy.  He 
declares one of the principle aims of Meditations to prove the existence of God, and God 
does ultimately figure into his explanation of the soul.  However the relationship between 
Descartes’ theological and scientific beliefs is less volatile and we can largely consider 
the former peripheral to our present discussion‡‡‡.  He does not offer a religious 
explanation in place of a scientific one a la intelligent design versus evolution, nor does 
he militantly insist on separate domains for religion and science.  Rather Descartes’ 
religion emerges as a de facto explanation when his science reaches its limit but without 
                                                     
††† Perhaps he has the Trinity in mind here. 
‡‡‡ While the interplay between religion and science is very much still a relevant question and 
could be considered in an equally comprehensive work solely devoted to the subject, this 
assertion simply maintains that it can largely be separated from the present question. 
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precluding future compatibility.  He seems to subscribe to the school that on the one hand 
mechanistic scientific explanation does not diminish the power or wonder of God, but on 
the other his faith leaves open the possibility that some things may be unintelligible.  
Taking this perspective, one can treat God or Nature in Descartes’ theory of mind, even 
where he explicitly figures in as an explanation, as functionally synonymous with another 
black box, whose contents may very well be spiritual, but may also be neurological§§§. 
 Descartes vies with figures like Ptolemy, Franz Joseph Gall, and Jean-Baptiste 
Lamarck for having amassed the most criticism for his ideas or their implications.  He has 
been criticized by both contemporaries and successors variously for his thermodynamic 
theory of blood flow, the alleged implication of a homunculus fallacy, and perhaps most 
poignantly, for his depiction of non-human animals as non-sentient.  Descartes maintains 
that the soul and all of its functions are a distinctly human faculty, and therefore the 
implication is that in lacking a soul, animals lack consciousness; he is then construed as 
implying that animals do not feel pain.  While he does explicitly deny this charge, his 
discussion of higher vertebrates proves interesting. 
 
“even though [animals] have no reason and perhaps no thought either, all the 
movements of the spirits and the gland that excite the passions in us still exist in 
them, and serve in them to maintain and strengthen, not the passions as in us, but 
the nerve and muscle movements that usually accompany them19.” 
 
Essentially animals share all of the faculties that are not exclusively ascribed to the soul – 
sensation, imagination, memory, as well as those which do involve the soul, except they 
necessarily achieve the same ends without the soul.  This concession on Descartes’ part 
allows for the interpretation that the soul in humans is peripheral, a construct that serves 
the sole purpose of endowing humans with a “distinctive power or ability… …in virtue 
of which some of their actions are subject to moral evaluation9,” and thus figures more 
into Descartes’ moral philosophy than an explanation of mental phenomena. 
 This does not constitute a challenge to the sincerity of Descartes’ convictions or 
suppose that he constructed his theory the way it is now being dismantled, layering the 
soul onto an already viable explanation; in fact this can only be done retroactively for 
                                                     
§§§ Note that this refers specifically to the hyperbolic doubt → cogito → mind/body dualism track 
that we have followed; there are other aspects of Descartes where theology plays a more critical 
role and should not be regarded in this way. 
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reasons which will become evident shortly.  In an annotation to his translation of 
Passions, Stephen Voss identifies seven questions that Descartes poses “in comparing 
higher animals with people:  Do animals have life, souls, sensation, passions, thought, 
reason, the use of language19?” and notes that Descartes’ answers are complex and often 
contradictory.  Clarke attempts to identify univocal answers to each of these questions in 
Descartes9, we makes the same attempt here: 
 
life yes 
souls no 
sensation yes 
passions in a strict sense no, but a functional equivalent 
thought ambiguous, Descartes supposes not but maintains that 
this cannot be proven3
reason no 
language no 
 
Clarke launches into a lengthy discussion of the human capacity for language, and 
attributes a great deal to it in understanding Descartes, though Descartes wrote 
comparatively very little about language.  In contrast to human reason as a “silent and 
wordless world that would allow undisturbed reliance on intuition1,” for Clarke 
“language is essential for metaphysical or abstract thinking,” i.e. wordless thought is 
impossible.  Moreover, he distinguishes between human and animal language in that the 
latter is invariant and reflexive, i.e. animal utterances are the direct and automatic result 
of external stimuli, whereas human language is rooted in convention and requires rational 
thought.  In the Fifth Objections, Pierre Gassendi levels a criticism at Descartes’ theory 
of mind framed from linguistic capacity but extrapolated to other cognitive functions.  He 
challenges “the claim that there is a difference in kind, rather than merely in degree, 
between the human mind and the corresponding faculties in other animals9.”  He 
maintains that “although human being are foremost among animals, they still belong to 
the same class9,” i.e. the question that we have already entertained as to whether there is a 
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fundamental discrete difference between humans and other animals or whether the 
distinction ranges along a continuum. 
 In his response to Gassendi in 1637, Descartes writes with no way of having 
anticipated how drastically the rules of the game would change two hundred and twelve 
years later when a British naturalist named Charles Darwin would publish The Origin of 
Species.  By the old rules, Descartes’ explanation is plausible; after 1859, “Nothing in 
Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution22.”  Theodosius Dobzhansky 
concludes his paper by that name, “evolution is a light which illuminates all facts, a 
trajectory which all lines of thought must follow.22”  Considering Descartes in the context 
of evolution, obviously a necessary anachronism, though one Descartes would readily 
concede to, renders the supposition of a fundamental distinction between humans and 
animals absurd, and in Descartes’ own words, “undermining the foundations will cause 
whatever has been built upon them to crumble of its own accord17.” 
 The other major charge leveled at Descartes is that the mind-body dichotomy that 
emerges in his works leads to what has come to be known as Cartesian Dualism.  While 
nominally associated with him, this system represents four centuries of distortion, and the 
thesis of Baker and Morris’ Descartes’ Dualism is that Cartesian Dualism, or what they 
label to the Cartesian Myth, would be scarcely recognizable to René Descartes.  
Desmond Clarke, Dennis Sepper, and this author join this consensus, and while the 
nuances of what each proposes as an alternative differ, this author adds his voice to the 
univocal attestation that Cartesian Dualism is not a necessary, preferential or perhaps 
even possible interpretation of the primary Cartesian texts. 
 In the second chapter of Descartes’ Dualism, the name for their proposed 
reinterpretation, Baker and Morris identify four tenets of classical Cartesian Dualism4: 
1. two distinct worlds, one consisting of physical objects and the other of mental 
objects 
2. physical objects characterized by mechanistic operation (clockwork) and mental 
objects by consciousness 
3. objective accessibility of physical objects by the senses in contrast to private, 
privileged, and infallible knowledge of mental objects 
4. causal interactionism between physical and mental objects 
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A battery of unpleasant implications follows.  The ‘two-world view’ creates an 
unnecessary pleonastic system akin to the Scholastic tradition that Descartes sought to 
break with.  A corollary of the ‘consciousness and clockwork’ dichotomy is the 
expansion thesis, taken from Descartes’ definition of a thinking thing as ‘thing that 
doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and also that imagines and senses,’ 
which expands the functions of the mind or soul at the expense of those of the body, the 
so called contraction thesis, moving the boundary between mind and body from that 
between ‘intellect’ and ‘sense’ to between ‘consciousness’ and ‘clockwork.’  Cartesian 
introspection, our infallible knowledge of our own mind, is described in analogy with 
sense perception, and the plethora of difficulties with causal interactionism have already 
been explored at length.  Baker and Morris summarize Cartesian Dualism as “a picture of 
two worlds, one of physical objects known through sense-perception and one of mental 
objects known through infallible introspection which (mysteriously!) causally interact 
with each other,” and then assert that this is “entirely at odds with the very framework of 
Descartes’ thinking4.” 
 In what they name ‘Descartes’ dualism’ to contrast it with Cartesian dualism, 
Baker and Morris enumerate a parallel set of maxims that they believe more accurately 
reflects Descartes’ own views as expressed in his texts: 
1. there are two and only two kinds of substances, corporeal things and thinking 
things 
2. the essence of the mind is thought, the essence of the body is extension 
3. bodies and their properties are objects of sense-perception; minds and their 
properties cannot be 
4. human mind and body are ‘substantially united’ but interaction between mind and 
body is ‘rationally unintelligible’ 
Their system is certainly truer to the texts that we have surveyed thus far, though at the 
outset a claim was made that the author would take license to deviate where appropriate 
from the explicit statements of seventeenth century Descartes to the corresponding 
relevant ideological homologs.  This license is applied here to deemphasize the 
metaphysical distinction between mind and body that comprises the first two of these 
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maxims, and to highlight a salient feature of Baker and Morris’ version of Descartes’ 
dualism. 
 A feature of the Aristotelian theory of mind that predominated prior to Descartes 
was the classification of predicates into four types that corresponded to the type of soul 
that was required.  The simplest were merely descriptive predicates, C-predicates, that 
could be applied to corporeal objects; “the car was red.”  Ascending the hierarchy, the 
next step requires a vegetative soul, ascribed to plants, animals, essentially anything 
organic; “the bacteria was dividing.”  Next are S-predicates, which required a 
‘sensitive**** soul;’ “the dog sees light.”  Finally, the highest class, the R-predicates, 
requiring a rational soul, are ascribed only to humans; “the reader judges that this 
exercise is slightly ridiculous.”  Descartes dispenses with the need for a separate class of 
S-predicates by pointing out their inherent ambiguity; a member of this class must 
correspond to a corporeal body or to a rational soul, but not simultaneously to both; “the 
dog sees1 light is of the former” while “the dog sees2 light” is of the latter.  This is not 
just an exercise in semantics, but rather now only the precisely defined two-subscript 
verbs are associated with mental substances; everything else is associated with corporeal 
bodies, and the construct of the ‘sensitive soul’ drops out. 
 This narrowing of the domain of the soul is quintessential feature of Baker and 
Morris’ version of Descartes’ dualism, and also the most important observation to be 
gleaned from our distillation of the Cartesian texts.  In stark contrast to the expansion 
thesis, and the accusation that Descartes has perpetuated a non-physical entity as an 
essential feature of understanding human mental capacity, this interpretation suggests 
precisely the opposite.  Instead, Descartes attempted to carve out a specific niche for the 
soul that contained only the functions absolutely unique to it, intellect and volition, or 
moral agency, while simultaneously expanding what could be accounted for 
mechanically.  Consistent with the trend noted through his physiology and natural 
philosophy, Descartes sought to genuinely and adequately explain as many phenomena as 
possible.  Baker and Morris note that 
 
“His vision (or programme) of extending the scope of mechanical explanation has 
affinities with the modern prejudice that physical explanations underlie all 
                                                     
**** Literally, capable of sensing 
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phenomena (that quantum mechanics is the least common denominator of all 
scientific explanations, and that other explanations, for example, in chemistry or 
biology, are simply place-holders for a complete quantum-mechanical explanation 
to be worked out in the scientific millennium)4.” 
 
By analogy, Descartes’ theory of mind as it stands is a placeholder for a complete 
neuroscientific explanation.  While Baker and Morris qualify this, identifying an 
“absolute or metaphysical limit on the possibility of scientific explanation4,” Clarke, with 
whom this author agrees here, is more ambitious, maintaining that “the Cartesian theory 
of mind is a first rather bold step in the direction of removing souls completely from 
explanations of human behaviour, because they are mere non-explanatory redescriptions 
of the phenomena to be explained9.”  In the first half of the seventeenth century, 
Descartes could not satisfactorily eliminate the construct of the soul completely, and this 
likely was not his explicit goal, but he did succeed in attributing as many functions as 
possible to the physiological brain.  The soul remained as a black box to house the 
aspects of human mental function that were inaccessible in his time.  However we now 
have the tools to open this black box and continue the process that he started, rendering 
the non-physical mind purely vestigial.  To the capacities he left to the soul, intellect and 
volition or moral agency, we now apply the modern term ‘executive function.’  The 
present goal is to take Descartes’ work a step further, and assert that the totality of our 
mental and cognitive capacities can be, and necessarily must be, explained in a single 
domain, thus making the mind-brain distinction superfluous. 
 
Inside the Black Box: 
 Having qualified the nature of the mind-brain dichotomy as it emerges from 
Cartesian philosophy and liberated Descartes from the gross distortions that have 
attached themselves to his name over the past four centuries, the present investigation 
now intends to reconcile this version of Descartes with the scientific landscape of the 
twenty-first century.  The preceding analysis identified a restricted, contrary to the 
presupposed expanded version suggested by Cartesian dualism, domain belonging 
exclusively to the non-corporeal soul, namely intellect and volition.  The intention is to 
demonstrate that all aspects of this greatly reduced domain can now, though perhaps they 
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could not in 1650, be explained entirely in terms of a physiological brain and to render 
the hypothesis of a disembodied soul unnecessary.   
The author believes that had Descartes had at his disposal the theory of evolution 
and neuron doctrine he would have necessarily arrived at the same conclusion, namely 
that the soul has become pleonastic.  Thus the present discussion does not intend to 
suggest Descartes’ theory is antiquated and obsolete but rather that his ideas are largely 
compatible with modern neuroscience and that the past four centuries have provided the 
tools to open the black box encasing the highest levels of human cognitive function.  As 
will become apparent, the black box of the human mind* is akin to a set of Russian 
nesting dolls; opening one black box yields others within it.  However, a feature of the 
landscape as it stands today is that this analogy holds completely; there is necessarily a 
solid doll at the center and not an infinite regress.  One can now assert the plausibility of 
explaining the entirety of the workings of the human mind entirely in terms of neurons 
and their interactions.  This is not meant to suggest that 21st century neuroscientists 
possess a complete understanding of the human brain, but that one is on the horizon, 
refuting the suggestion that there is an “absolute or metaphysical limit on the possibility 
of scientific explanation4” with regard to the human mind. 
 Before embarking on this journey, it proves useful to highlight some of the 
fundamental changes in scientific thought between Descartes’ time and ours that warrant 
this paradigm shift and allow one to dismiss the idea of a non-corporeal soul because it is 
no longer necessary, useful, or even plausible.  We have already discussed evolution, but 
it is worth emphasizing again here.  The Dobzhansky paper captures the most essential 
feature of modern biology, science, and perhaps even thought in general, in its title, 
Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in the Light of Evolution22.  Once one accepts the 
evolution of biological systems, on global, species, and biochemical levels, everything 
must subsequently be understood within this framework.  There can be no fundamental 
distinction between humans and other animals; we must necessarily be viewed along a 
continuum.  There is no teleology in evolution; structures, systems, and behavior patterns 
evolved out of precursors because they possessed some feature that conferred a survival 
advantage on individuals within a population.  Though not the focus of the present 
                                                     
** Now taken to reside entirely within the physical brain 
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investigation, the evolutionary context is a critical feature that one must remain cognizant 
of throughout the discussion.  In The Growth of Biological Thought, Ernst Mayr notes 
that a “difficulty for the historian is posed by most scientists’ unawareness of their own 
framework of ideas.  They rarely articulate – if they think about it at all – what truths or 
concepts they accept without question and what others they totally reject30.”  The author 
finds this an appropriate caution and wishes to avoid this pitfall in the present analysis.  
To allow too much into the former category is dangerous, and rather than amass a list of 
axioms, the author simply intends to note that the ‘framework of ideas’ of the twenty-first 
century is necessarily different from that of the seventeenth.  In addition to evolution, the 
other fundamental concept that transformed the landscape is cell theory, namely that 
living organisms are composed entirely of cells and that cells arise only from other cells. 
 
A Brief History of Post-Cartesian Neuroscience†: 
  It proves useful to the present discussion to concisely review the development of 
neuroscience from its infancy in Descartes’ time to the present.  This is by no means an 
exhaustive treatment but merely intended to set the context for our investigation of neural 
phenomena and also to highlight what was not known in Descartes’ time. 
 The nervous system consists of the brain, the spinal cord, and afferent (sensory) 
and efferent (motor) peripheral nerves.  Brain structures and nerve fibers are composed of 
cells called neurons, which are excitable cells that communicate via electrochemical 
signaling.  This occurs via something called an action potential, whereby an electrical 
impulse resulting in depolarization of the cell membrane is conducted from the cell body 
in one direction down the cell’s axon, a long projection for the purpose of carrying these 
signals to the target neuron.  At the axon terminus, chemical messengers called 
neurotransmitters are released into the synaptic cleft, the small gap between neurons, 
which bind to receptors on the target neuron.  Neural connections can either be 
excitatory, in which they depolarize the subsequent neuron and increase its likelihood of 
firing an action potential, or inhibitory, in which they hyperpolarize it and decrease this 
likelihood. Action potentials are all-or-none, meaning that a cell either fires one or does 
                                                     
† The Hawking reference is intentional28 
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not, and they contain no inherent qualitative information.  Rather information is conveyed 
by the rate of firing, the population of neurons firing, and the synchrony or lack thereof. 
 There are a number of discrete structures within the brain, each with particular 
functions.  It is not relevant to the present discussion to catalog these here or enter into a 
detailed discussion of neuroanatomy‡; instead the author intends simply to highlight a 
few historical and practical aspects of the idea of localization of brain function.  The 
scientific community has vacillated back and forth on this question in a largely 
reactionary fashion.  On the one extreme were the phrenologists who created detailed 
maps of the brain that contained a center for every conceivable intellectual or moral 
faculty.  A person’s temperament could be inferred from the shape of their skull because 
these faculties were correlated with the size of corresponding brain centers, and the iron 
bar that destroyed Phineas Gage’s frontal lobes§ passed somewhere “in the neighborhood 
of Benevolence and the front part of Veneration12.”  At the opposite extreme is the denial 
of any localization of function; according to Flourens, “The brain secretes thought as the 
liver secretes bile37.”  Obviously the truth lies somewhere between these two radical 
hypotheses.  The phrenologists did contribute the concept of brain specialization, but the 
notion of brain centers proves too restrictive.  It is readily apparent that at a tissue level 
the brain is heterogeneous; Brodmann identified forty-six areas based on 
cytoarchitectonic differences, which unsurprisingly correspond to functional divisions, 
for example, Brodmann’s area 17 is primary visual cortex. 
 Thus different brain processes occur at different locations in the brain.  Regions of 
the brainstem control vegetative and homeostatic operations.  There are specific regions, 
both cortical and subcortical, devoted to processing specific modes of sensory 
information.  For example, auditory information is processed in the cortex of the 
temporal lobes and the medial geniculate nuclei of the thalamus.  Similarly there are 
regions involved in motor function that project from motor cortex to the spinal cord and 
then to the skeletal muscles.  On the one hand, this localization of function can be highly 
specific; for instance lesions to Broca’s area, a tiny region of the left frontal lobe, 
selectively disrupts expressive language.  We will return to this theme shortly.  However 
                                                     
‡ Although familiarity with basic neuroanatomy is certainly advantageous to the discussions that 
follow 
§ Discussed at length below
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the nervous system is more complex than this and most of its faculties are far more 
diffuse, and represented in neural networks that span many brain regions rather than 
residing in specific loci.   
Francis Crick emphasizes the appropriateness of this reductionist approach to 
neuroscience, namely that a complex system can be explained entirely in terms of its 
component parts and their interactions.  This structural reductionism is evident at the 
juncture of biology, physics, and chemistry, where one explains organisms in terms of 
cells, cells in terms of molecules, molecules in terms of atoms, and atoms in terms of 
quantum mechanics.  The interactions between the parts of a system are as essential to its 
understanding as the parts themselves; Crick offers the benzene molecule as an example.  
Six atoms of carbon and twelve atoms of hydrogen tell part of the story, but it is 
necessary to consider the diffuse electrons and aromaticity to explain the reactivity and 
physical structure of the molecule.  This interaction is perhaps even more important when 
one considers the nervous system.  While neurons do vary, in shape, size, number and 
distribution of neurites, type of neurotransmitter used, degree of myelination of their 
axons, and various other properties, they are on the other hand more similar than they are 
different, consisting of dendrites, a soma that contains all the features of any other cell, 
and a single axon that carries a single type of signal.  To explain the capacities of even 
the most basic brain, nevermind the intricacies of the human mind, solely in terms of 
individual neurons would be a daunting task; it is the nature of the connections between 
these hundred billion cells from which we derive the emergent behavior of the nervous 
system. 
Localization of brain function, to the extent that it does occur, has provided one of 
the most valuable tools for studying neuroscience.  If damage to brain region A results in 
disturbance in behavior or function X, then one can conclude that A is essential for X, or 
that A to some extent occurs in X.  Moreover since by definition A is an element of the 
set that comprises the physical brain, then X can in turn be attributed to the physical 
brain.  Antonio Damasio further describes this experimental neuropsychological approach 
for “finding systematic correlations between damage at given brain sites and disturbances 
of behavior and cognition” in terms of finding double dissociations, whereby “damage at 
site A causes disturbance X but not disturbance Y, while damage at site B causes 
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disturbance Y but not disturbance X12.”  The next step is to use these observations to 
formulate hypotheses about function in a normal brain, the goal being to “explain how 
certain cognitive operations and their components relate to neural systems and their 
components,” not, Damasio cautions, about “finding the brain ‘localization’ for a 
‘symptom’ or ‘syndrome.’”  Thus in our present investigation, though it may be an 
attractive hypothesis, we have no need for a conclusion of the form the will is located in 
the anterior cingulate gyrus, but merely one of the form selective brain lesions can 
perturb functions associated with the will, therefore it is likely that this faculty can be 
explained in terms of the physical brain. 
Lesion studies provide the primary means for this type of investigation, and have 
yielded a wealth of information.  In humans we consider unintended brain lesions 
resulting from injury, stroke, or neurodevelopmental disorder whereby a specific brain 
region is damaged, or deliberate surgical lesions performed, usually to correct a more 
debilitating problem such as epilepsy.  However nature pays no attention to 
cytoarchitecture, and these lesions are often crude.  Animal experiments allow us to use a 
finer point brush and perform deliberate selective lesions that would be unethical in 
humans.  Complementing the information learned from lesion studies is a more transient 
and less invasive but perhaps equally informative tool – neuroimaging.  Using positron 
emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), it is 
possible to view relative brain activity measured by blood flow and glucose uptake in real 
time to determine which brain regions are most active during particular brain processes.  
Combined, these two approaches give us a powerful window into the inner workings of 
the nervous system that was unavailable to Descartes, and the hope is that from this better 
vantage point, we can illuminate a physiological explanation for those faculties that 
remained inside Descartes’ black box. 
Having established sufficient Cartesian and neuroscientific context, we now allow 
these two tracts to intersect.  Essentially the programme is to catalog a series of the most 
fascinating aspects of the human mind that can be explained in terms of the physiological 
brain.  Structurally this section loosely recapitulates the previous; we consider 
approximately the same topics in the same order, beginning with sensation and ending 
with the will.  The intention is that with regard to each capacity that Descartes left to the 
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soul, the exponential increase in explanatory power over the past four hundred years will 
provide a striking enough contrast for the reader to conclude that a disembodied soul is 
no longer a necessary hypothesis.  By considering some of the most subtle and ‘higher-
order’ phenomena within each of these domains, the author intends to provide a 
counterpoint to Descartes’ supposition that for example, most sensory processing occurs 
within the brain but at its highest levels requires the soul.  The process represents a 
continuation of Descartes narrowing the domain of the soul, with the additional goal of 
rendering it a potentially empty set and thus a null hypothesis that can be rejected. 
 
Sensory Phenomena: 
 The account of sensation that emerges from Descartes is ambiguous; “[sensing,] 
precisely so taken is nothing other than thinking17” though it “surely does not take place 
without a body17,” yet simultaneously, “what I thought I had seen with my eyes, I 
actually grasped solely with the faculty of judgment, which is in my mind17.”  Even if one 
accepts the previous arguments whereby sensation was largely allocated to the physical 
brain even in Descartes’ system, he does still to some extent attribute sensation2 to the 
disembodied mind, and thus this proves a useful place to begin.  Descartes himself 
discusses sensation at length, and a great deal of work in modern neuroscience has been 
done with regard to sensation, because of its relative approachability and the comparative 
ease with which it is understood.  Francis Crick identifies several reasons for using 
sensation, particularly visual perception, which is where we will begin, though other 
sensory systems will be considered, as a springboard and archetypical example of brain 
function11.  He notes that our sensory world is vivid and rich in information, sensory 
input is structured but easy to control, and it is conducive to animal experiments.  While 
this concreteness establishes sensation as a suitable entry point into our investigation, it is 
far from trivial, and the intricacies of the human sensory world, and their capability to be 
explained in terms of the brain, will readily become manifest. 
 
The Human Visual System: 
 Descartes gave a comprehensive account of his understanding of the human visual 
system, and as was noted above, his explanations were remarkably accurate, especially 
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considering the context.  Both for comparison and also as background, we present an 
account of the human visual system as it is understood today and juxtapose Descartes’ for 
the purpose of establishing the functional homologs between the two models in order to 
circumscribe those faculties most likely to be deemed extra-physiological.  Subsequent 
examples are spared such painstaking detail, but the author deems it worthwhile to 
explicate the process once. 
 Visual information in the environment, i.e. light reflected from physical objects, 
impinges on the sense organs, namely the eyes.  Some physical optical processes occur 
that are not especially relevant; our neural model begins with the absorption of photons, 
or particles of light, by the pigment within the photoreceptor cells of the retina.  The 
physical stimulus, light, is transduced into a neural signal by these cells.  Photons 
absorbed by the photopigment in the photoreceptors cause a conformational change in 
photopigment that signals, through a biochemical cascade, the closing of specific ion 
channels that elicits a change in membrane potential.  In this way, physical energy in the 
form of photons is converted into an electrical signal.  Some neural processing about the 
physical stimulus occurs in the retina itself, and eventually information about the visual 
information in the environment, now represented entirely in the form of an electrical 
signal, is further transformed as it is carried to subsequent nervous system structures.  
The retina projects primarily to a subcortical structure called the thalamus, specifically 
the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN).  There are a few important features about this 
projection to point out.  First, there is a retinotopic map, or representation of the visual 
field on the retina, which is repeated in subsequent structures.  Equally important, 
information remains segregated; different neurons fire differentially in response to 
different features of the stimuli – color, orientation, motion, location, and these project to 
cells along segregated pathways in which all neurons are sensitive to the same types of 
features.  An emergent property from these two is that certain fibers from each eye cross 
the midline, such that information in the right visual hemifield is processed by the left 
LGN and information in the left visual hemifield is processed by the right LGN.  Finally, 
the LGN is not the only target of the retina; there are other projections involved in 
orientation, circadian rhythms, and movement of the ocular muscles. 
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 The LGN then projects to primary visual cortex, a region of the occipital lobe.  
This region in turn projects to extrastriate visual areas, a series of regions that process 
increasingly complex features of the visual stimulus.  The immediate targets of primary 
visual cortex are other occipital areas, V2 and V3, and then the information is directed 
along two parallel streams that maintain the segregation inherent in the pathway since the 
retina.  The dorsal stream projects through the parietal lobe and processes features 
concerned with visual motion.  The ventral stream projects through the temporal lobe and 
is concerned largely with object recognition.  High level processing occurs here along 
each of these streams; for example, selective lesions to certain parietal regions can 
destroy solely one’s ability to perceive motion, and there is region of the inferotemporal 
lobe that may be involved exclusively in face recognition.  These two streams then 
project to a wide range of cortical and subcortical targets whereby visual information is 
integrated with information from other sensory modalities, stored in memory, used to 
influence decision making, volitional movement, and a multitude of other responses.  An 
important feature of this pathway is that it is not unidirectional; while information is 
largely segregated, there is crosstalk between these semi-independent pathways at all 
levels, between cortical layers, between the dorsal and ventral streams, and between this 
pathway and extrastriate visual pathways.  Moreover, a significant amount of feedback to 
earlier stages of processing occurs as well. 
 Consider this pathway juxtaposed with Descartes’ below.  This diagram is an 
oversimplification, especially on the right side.  It neglects to show the bidirectionality, 
omits some projects, and does not include much of the crosstalk or parallel pathways.  
The intent is not to faithfully depict the intricacies of the visual system, but rather to 
provide a schematic diagram for comparative purposes: 
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Retina Retina 
 
Note that both models begin with the retina, and the subsequent brain structures largely 
correspond.  Descartes identifies specific brain structures associated with vision, which 
we will equate with the LGN and primary visual cortex.  The common sense corresponds 
to multisensory integration, which actually occurs somewhat further beyond the occipital 
lobe.  Descartes’ phantasia, or imagination, can be equated with consciousness, or visual 
cortex, both primary and extrastriate (V1, V2, V3, V4).  Finally, the vis cognoscens, or 
‘force with which we properly know things,’ corresponds to these highest levels of visual 
processing, which from the diagram necessarily overlaps with conscious perception, but 
is also downstream of the most basic realization of this.  The intention here is to 
demonstrate that the most salient features of human visual perception can be explained 
entirely in terms of these most downstream structures, and therefore equating Descartes’ 
vis cognoscens with the set comprised entirely of these structures is a reasonable 
conclusion. 
LGN
V1
V2
V3
V4 MT 
IT MST 
other ventral 
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Visual Structures 
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other dorsal 
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 Selective lesions to areas of the brain involved in visual processing can produce 
highly specific deficits.  The retinotopic organization of the visual system predicts that 
lesions to areas of the retina, LGN, or striate cortex, will result in a scotoma, or blind spot 
in the part of the visual field corresponding to the lesioned tissue.  For instance, one 
would expect, and this is indeed the case*, that complete ablation of primary visual cortex 
on the right side would result in complete loss of conscious vision in the left visual 
hemifield.  As one progresses further downstream, the results of lesions become more 
interesting.  Damage to regions along the ventral stream can result in the selective loss of 
color vision, a condition known as cerebral achromatopsia†.  The most striking feature of 
cerebral achromatopsia is that subjects, who previously had normal color vision, not only 
completely lose the ability to see in color, but also can no longer imagine colors that were 
previously known to them.  An equally specific disturbance to visual perception is a 
condition known as prosopagnosia, where one loses the ability to recognize faces.  
Affected persons retain the ability to recognize a face as a face, as well as to perceive its 
individual features – they can describe the eyes, the nose, the mouth, but somehow lose 
the ability to perceive the face as a gestalt or to identify to whom a particular face 
belongs, including even one’s own face.  Damage to areas in the dorsal stream interferes 
with one’s ability to perceive movement, which is difficult to conceive.  Affected persons 
see still images, an object in one place, and then in another, but somehow are unable to 
perceive fluidity of motion and see things perhaps as if illuminated by a strobe light.  One 
can imagine the difficulty such a person would have in crossing the street or filling a cup 
of tea, both of which are noted in Francis Crick’s account of a case study by Joseph 
Zihl11.  Crick draws the comparison to our failure to perceive the hour hand of a clock as 
moving, but on an accelerated timescale. 
 
Blindsight: 
 Perhaps the most intriguing visual anomaly is a phenomenon known as blindsight, 
which is defined by the Oxford Concise Medical Dictionary as “a condition in which the 
                                                     
* Albeit with some remarkable qualifications that form the basis for the discussion of blindsight 
that follows 
† Oliver Sacks describes a very interesting case of cerebral achromatopsia in The Colorblind 
Painter in his book Anthropologist on Mars37 
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sufferer responds to visual stimuli without consciously perceiving them31,” or 
alternatively by Larry Weiskrantz, the Oxford psychologist who has most extensively 
studied the phenomenon and given it its name, as “visual capacity in a field defect in the 
absence of acknowledged awareness41.”  As promised, the statement made above, that 
‘complete ablation of primary visual cortex on the right side would result in complete 
loss vision in the left visual hemifield,’ is now slightly revised, and we append the 
familiar ‘two’ subscript to ‘vision,’ to emphasize that such a lesion completely destroys 
conscious perception of vision.  In blindsight however, some residual visual capacity is 
retained in spite of this complete perceptual blindness.  Subjects adamantly deny any 
vision in the blind part of the visual field, yet there is a discrepancy between this verbal 
denial and performance on tasks that assess visual function. 
 The retinogeniculocortical visual projection described above, where visual 
information flows from the retina to the LGN to primary visual cortex, is the primary 
pathway mediating vision, and perhaps the only one mediating conscious vision, but it is 
not the only visual pathway.  Blindsight is characterized by lesions to primary visual 
cortex; pregeniculate lesions are accompanied by minimal, if any, residual visual 
capacity41.  Primary visual cortex is required for conscious perception of vision, but a 
parallel pathway through the midbrain, where retinal neurons project to a structure called 
the superior colliculus, which in turn has targets in the pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus, 
that projects to extrastriate visual cortex, has been implicated in the preservation of some 
of the visual capacities retained in blindsight patients.  Because cortical blindness 
frequently results from occipital damage caused by trauma or stroke, it is often unilateral, 
resulting in a hemianopia, or loss of vision in only one visual hemifield.  Bilateral striate 
cortex lesions are rare, and most blindsight patients therefore have a visual field divided 
into a region where they have normal conscious vision and a region in which they are 
completely blind. 
 The historical context in which Weiskrantz began his investigation of blindsight 
prompts a return to the question of whether there is a fundamental difference between 
humans and other animals.  While the primary visual pathway had been identified, a 
growing number of researchers began to confront seemingly paradoxical observations 
regarding occipital lesions in human versus nonhuman subjects41, calling into question 
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whether striate cortex was indeed essential for vision.  Complete lesions of striate cortex 
in monkeys sometimes seemed to have minimal effects on vision, whereas in humans 
scotomas were observed with no residual visual capacity41.  The resolution of this 
paradox is that a phenomenon like blindsight, and its consequent implications, is 
discovered when surprising observations manifest under specific methods of testing.  A 
discrepancy between what a subject sees1 and sees2 can only be identified if the subject is 
able to report what he or she sees2, which is facilitated by a human subject, though the 
inability of a nonhuman primate to convey with ease whether or not it can see2 does not 
preclude this capacity and require one to suppose a fundamental difference. 
 The textbook blindsight case is a patient known as D.B., whom Weiskrantz began 
studying in 1974.  D.B. had an “arteriovenous malformation at the pole of the right 
occipital lobe41,” which resulted in severely debilitating headaches that increased in 
frequency and severity.  The region was surgically excised, resulting in removal of much 
of his right striate cortex and the expected scotoma in his left visual hemifield.  The 
remarkable feature of his case however, is that “D.B. appeared to be able to locate objects 
in his supposed blind field much more skillfully than one might have expected.  For 
example, even though D.B. could not see one’s outstretched hand, he seemed to reach for 
it accurately41.”  Weiskrantz’s initial informal assessment of D.B.’s residual visual 
capacity involved presenting a stick in either a horizontal or vertical orientation to the 
blind part of D.B.’s visual field, and asking him to guess its orientation.  D.B. performed 
nearly perfectly, but insisted that he did not see the stick at all, and was merely guessing. 
 The initial stick experiment forms the model for the subsequent tests that 
Weiskrantz performed to attempt to qualify what visual capacity D.B. retained.  Stimuli 
were presented to the blind part of his visual field, and D.B. was asked to report on 
various qualities of the stimuli based solely on guessing.  General features of the 
experiments were controls for ambient lighting, and variables included visual angle 
(distance from the fovea), illumination, orientation, and size of stimuli.  Eye fixation, or 
D.B.’s ability to direct his eyes to a light shone in his blind field was assessed with 
moderate performance.  His ability to point to the location of a stimulus was better, with 
performance significantly above chance, often around 80-90%.  Similar results were 
observed for presence/absence experiments and identification of orientation.  Visual 
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acuity was assessed by presenting a grating and determining whether he was able to 
identify it as such.  Other experiments assessed his ability to detect movement, which was 
a function of velocity, and his ability to discriminate forms; he could readily distinguish 
between X’s and O’s, but not between an X and a triangle and only above a minimum 
size that was larger than that required for the same discrimination in his intact visual 
field.  D.B. was also able to identify the direction of contrast, i.e. a black spot on a grey 
background versus a white spot on the same background. 
 The contrast between his performance on these discrimination tasks, which was at 
times near perfect, and his persistent assertion that he was merely guessing, is striking.  
When questioned about the tasks, D.B. “stressed that he saw nothing in the sense of 
‘seeing,’ that typically he was guessing, and was at a loss for words to describe any 
conscious perception41.”  He was continually surprised at how well he performed on the 
tasks.  Moreover, as the testing progressed over several years and the tasks became more 
complex or he became more experienced with them, some subtleties emerged in his 
reporting, though it never deviated from the general trend of near complete denial of 
conscious perception and insistence that he was largely guessing.  Psychometric tests like 
these are often conducted only for a relatively short duration at a time because of 
diminishing performance with the onset of fatigue in the subject.  Weiskrantz once 
expressed this concern, to which D.B. replied, “I am not tired; I haven’t been doing 
anything41.”  
D.B. never reported seeing2 anything in his blind field, but when stimuli were 
presented with high contrast, he said on one account, “I felt as if something was coming 
up to me.  But I didn’t see anything41.”  When the contrast was reduced, he described his 
perception as “Nothing at all.  Just guessing.  No feelings of anything.  No idea at all41.”  
Similar variation was observed with respect to moving stimuli; Weiskrantz actually was 
able to identify a threshold at which D.B. asserted, “I could feel the movement, and I was 
absolutely sure of it41,” but again he insisted that he could not see anything.  Sometimes 
he described an experience of ‘waves’ in his blind visual field, which had various 
differential properties that sometimes formed the basis for his discrimination between 
stimuli, though again he insisted that he was not seeing and that the waves are “unlike 
anything in normal visual experience, and for which precise words seem to be lacking41.”   
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Further, there was no correlation whatsoever with either his identification of some 
form of percept or his report of how well he believed he performed on a particular task 
and his actual performance.  When D.B. claimed he felt something, or identified the 
experience of waves, he was no more inclined to correctly identify features of stimuli 
than when he maintained he was just guessing.  Similarly, he would often predict his 
performance was roughly chance when it was near perfect or assert with confidence that 
he may have missed one or two trials when his performance was in fact no better than 
chance. 
Weiskrantz’s extended study of D.B. has revealed a great deal about the 
phenomenon of blindsight, though a few observations from other cases are worth noting.  
A study by Zihl identified both improvement with practice in detection of the presence or 
absence of a stimulus, and also differential results based on response mode.  Subjects 
performed worse when required to indicate an affirmative response by verbally stating 
‘yes’ as opposed to merely initiating a voluntary eye-blink or pressing a button41.  
Another study by Marzi et al. exploits the observation that a normal subject’s reaction 
time is faster to two simultaneous flashes than a single flash.  In a clever modification to 
this experiment, the reaction times of a blindsighted subject were compared from a single 
flash presented in the intact visual field to two flashes, one of which was presented in the 
intact visual field and one in the blind visual field.  The shorter reaction time observed in 
the second case suggests that the flash in the blind visual field contributed to the 
performance.  In another experiment, subjects were able to differentiate between a full 
circle presented such that half of it appeared in the blind visual field and a semicircle 
presented at the interface of the intact and blind fields; the subjects completed the figure 
only when it actually was appropriate to.  Finally, a study by Marcel identifies some 
degree of semantic processing in the blind visual field.  He flashed a word in the blind 
field, the presence or absence of subjects could not detect better than chance, “but the 
interpretation of an auditorily presented polysemous word (bank) nevertheless could be 
biased depending on the meaning of the unseen word (river or money)41.” 
Beatrice de Gelder presents a final case for consideration, a rare case of complete 
bilateral loss of striate cortex23.  The patient, T.N. suffered two strokes in succession, and 
Gelder et al. note via imaging studies no remaining active visual cortex.  T.N. had worse 
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residual function than D.B., but exhibited “sophisticated visuo-spatial skills in the 
absence of perceptual awareness23;” he could “successfully navigate down the extent of a 
long corridor in which various barriers were placed.”
Not all of these capacities have been assessed in all subjects; it is highly unlikely 
they all retain the same residual visual capacities, but the complex and diverse functions 
that are retained reveal a remarkable dissociation between visual processing and 
conscious perception of such.  Weiskrantz summarizes the hallmark feature of blindsight, 
“where a patient shows a loss of awareness of any vision, or at best only a very degraded 
awareness, while at the same time displaying a sensitive capacity for detection and for 
performing certain discriminations that are independent of the requirement for 
acknowledging awareness” and emphasizes the “disjunction between their verbal reports 
and their discriminative capacity41.”  The inherent dependence of this phenomenon on 
subjective reporting has an interesting implication.  Weiskrantz notes that the distinction 
between ‘seeing’ and ‘not seeing’ and ‘guessing x’ and ‘guessing non-x’ corresponds to 
the same psychophysical procedure, simply with different response categories.  However, 
comparison of the same task performed by the same subject in seeing versus non-seeing 
fields illuminates the nature of visual awareness: 
 
“With supra-threshold stimuli for orientation, movement, or detection, we may 
find a virtually perfect performance, and yet the subject is adamant that they are 
quite different in quality: he is patently aware of one but not the other.  If pressed, 
he does not say ‘I can make a verbal response to one but not the other;’ he insists 
that they give rise to different experiences41” 
 
The ability to make a verbal response is a window into human consciousness, but it is not 
its only feature.  These cases reveal that something as specific, complex, and intimate to 
the human mind as conscious perception of visual stimuli can be selectively destroyed 
with the preservation of nearly every other faculty. 
 
Amusia: 
 Humans have an interesting and complex relationship with music.  Darwin writes 
in The Descent of Man, “As neither the enjoyment nor the capacity of producing musical 
notes are faculties of the least use to man… they must be ranked among the most 
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mysterious with which he is endowed38.”  Sidestepping the evolutionary question, one 
can still recognize the extent to which humans are a musical species, and perhaps with the 
exception of songbirds, the only such.  Descartes wrote little about music, but its inherent 
status as a higher level of sensory perception, possible exclusivity to humans, and its 
aesthetic and emotional qualities render music a candidate for a feature of the human 
mind that could reside near the hypothetical body-soul interface that we are attempting to 
eliminate. 
 As a sensory percept, music is a complex entity, consisting of both basic auditory 
properties – intensity and frequency, and also those particular to music – tone, timbre, 
melody, and rhythm.  One would expect focal lesions of the auditory cortex to produce 
particular predictable deficits, irresponsiveness to a particular frequency or complete tone 
deafness are both conceivable, for instance.  However the more interesting phenomenon 
is amusia, where “tones are not recognized as tones, and music, therefore, is not 
experienced as music38.” 
 Oliver Sacks‡ describes patient D.L., a seventy-six year old woman with 
congenital amusia, the dissociated inability to perceive music as music38.  The more basic 
elements of her auditory system are intact; D.L. has no hearing deficit or problem with 
expressive or receptive language.  She was not tone deaf nor had any difficulty imitating 
a rhythm; in fact she was a tap dancer as a young girl and now participates in rhythmic 
aerobics. 
 However D.L. simply cannot perceive music as music.  She recalls that in 
kindergarten children were asked to sing their names, and that she could not do this nor 
understand what everyone else was doing.  She was unable to identify songs; even as a 
teacher she could not recognize “Happy Birthday” despite that fact that she would play it 
at least thirty times a year.  When asked to describe what other people hear as music, 
D.L. responded, “If you were in my kitchen and threw all the pots and pans on the floor, 
that’s what I hear38!”  Another amusic likened his experience to ‘a screeching car,’ and 
                                                     
‡ Sacks actually describes a number of phenomena relating to music in Musciophilia38, including 
musical hallucinations, musical seizures, various types of amusia, savant-like musical talents, 
absolute pitch, musical synesthesia, and the relationship of music with various disorders including 
amnesia, Tourette’s, Parkinson’s disease, Williams syndrome, and dementia. 
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another maintained that the extent of his discriminatory capacity was that “he could say 
only that [a particular musical piece] was “The Marseillaise” or that it was not38.” 
 This perplexing condition, the selective dissociated loss of the capacity to 
perceive music, provides another window into the types of processes that must occur in 
the brain and further diminishes the likelihood of an entity that functions outside of this 
system. 
 
Somatosensory Anomalies: 
 The somatosensory system, through which we perceive sensations of touch, pain, 
temperature, body position, and body movement is unique in that these sensations are 
“localized directly on the sensory surface where the receptors are actually located35,” 
whereas in every other system sensation is projected onto the external world.  In fact a 
subset of the somatosensory receptors correspond to the internal viscera, and while this 
system still comprises an external sense in both Descartes’ seven sense system and our 
own, it does begin to bridge the gap between internal and external sensation and is in 
many ways more intimate than the others.  Anomalies in this system that can be 
understood in terms of brain function provide additional evidence to doubt the need of an 
extra-corporeal soul. 
 In a condition known as phantom limb syndrome, named and first clinically 
described by Silas Weir Mitchell, patients “experience an amputated extremity as still 
present, and in some cases also experience pain or cramping in the missing limb35.”  
Somatosensory sensation is still perceived even in the absence of the physical limb, 
though “the patient recognizes that the sensations are not veridical, i.e., what he/she 
experiences is an illusion35.”  Interestingly, while we offer this condition and its 
physiological explanation as reason to discount the hypothesis of a soul, it has actually 
been employed historically to suggest the exact opposite interpretation: 
 
“After Lord Nelson lost his right arm during an unsuccessful attack on Santa Cruz 
de Tenerife, he experienced compelling phantom limb pains, including the 
sensation of fingers digging into his phantom palm.  The emergence of these 
ghostly sensations led the sea lord to proclaim that his phantom was ‘direct proof 
of the existence of the soul.’  If an arm can survive physical annihilation, why not 
the entire person35?” 
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The Admiral was not alone in experiencing this bizarre phenomenon; in fact it occurs in 
ninety to ninety-eight percent of amputees following surgery, though in most cases the 
phantom sensations gradually fade after a few weeks or days.   
In those cases where the phantom limb does persist, clinical observations range 
over a wide spectrum.  Ramachandran notes that “phantoms are more vivid, and persist 
longer, after traumatic limb loss, or following amputation for a pre-existing painful limb 
pathology, than after a planned surgical amputation of a non-painful limb35.”  Patients 
often experience the sensation of pain in their phantom limbs.  Perception of motor 
control ranges from paralysis; to a habitual posture, one patient who had a grenade 
explode in his hand retained this clenched and painful posture; to the ability to voluntarily 
move the phantom limb; to the perception of involuntary movement of the phantom.  
Moreover, “patients sometimes continue to feel a wedding ring or watch band on the 
phantom35.”  In one case, a patient “reported that, before amputation, the arthritic joint 
pains in her fingers would often flare up when the weather was damp and cold.  
Remarkably, whenever the air became humid the same pains would recur in her phantom 
fingers35.” 
In the absence of the limb, rearrangement occurs in somatosensory cortex and 
afferent axons from other body areas develop connections to cortical neurons that 
previously received input from the now missing limb.  Just as there is a retinotopic map 
of the visual world, primary somatosensory cortex contains a somatotopic map, a 
representation of the touch receptors throughout the body laid out on this region of the 
brain.  There is some distortion in this map; more processing power is devoted to regions 
with more sensitivity and areas that are adjacent on the body proper are not necessarily so 
in their cortical representation.  For instance, in the somatotopic map, the upper limbs are 
adjacent to the face.  The resulting reorganization after upper limb amputation 
documented by Ramachandran is exactly what one would expect from this type of 
organization; there are two sites that when stimulated induce sensation in the phantom 
limb corresponding to the regions on both sides of the now deafferented cortex.  Patients 
report sensation in the phantom limb in response to stimulation of either the lower 
ipsilateral face or the region just above the amputation line.  Moreover these areas of 
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referred sensations preserved a continuous and stable somatotopy.  Stimulation near the 
amputation line was often more robust; Ramachandran describes a case where a patient 
would report sensation in the phantom limb when he stroked her face but not when she 
performed the stroking herself35.  This suggests some form of inhibition perhaps because 
the “tactile sensations are perfectly coordinated with the patient’s motor commands35.” 
Ramachandran constructed an experimental device called a virtual-reality box or 
a mirror box where a subject’s intact limb is reflected so as to give the visual illusion of 
the non-existent contralateral limb.  This has revealed some of the most interesting 
aspects of phantom limb syndrome.  A patient, D.S., was able to overcome paralysis in a 
phantom arm by attempting to perform bilateral symmetric movements in the device; 
apparently the illusory visual feedback from the reflection of the existing arm was 
sufficient to liberate the phantom from its paralysis.  When the mirror was removed, he 
reported the arm as once again “frozen as in a cement block35.”  This was repeated in a 
total of ten patients with results along a spectrum; some required maintenance of the 
visual illusion for motor control, some were able to learn to move the phantom limb with 
the subsequent absence of the device.  Three observations involving the device prove 
especially illustrative.  In one case, the phantom limb simply disappeared completely 
after repeated practice.  In another, the device generated illusions whereby it appeared 
that a phantom finger was hyperextended into an anatomically impossible position, and 
the patient reported, with great surprise, actually experiencing this position.  Finally, 
Ramachandran tested a finger amputee who had briefly experienced a phantom 
immediately after the amputation, but not in 28 years; the phantom returned instantly 
when the patient looked in the mirror device35. 
 Other somatosensory illusions in non-phantom limb patients provide an 
interesting complement.  In one, called the phantom nose, a subject is blindfolded and the 
experimenter uses the subject’s hand to stroke the nose of a second subject sitting in front 
of him, while simultaneously using his own hand to stroke the initial subject’s nose in 
perfect synchrony.  The subject develops the powerful illusion that his own nose has 
either been dislocated or stretched several feet in front of him35.  In another illusion, a 
subject is made to “project tactile sensations onto an inanimate object35,” i.e. a shoe.  The 
subject’s hand is placed out of site under a table, and the experimenter strokes or taps the 
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subjects hand and a shoe placed on the table, again in perfect synchrony, and “after 10-30 
seconds, the subject starts developing the uncanny illusion that the sensations are now 
coming from the shoe and that the shoe is now part of his body35.”  A powerful 
confirmation of the firmness of this illusion is that when the experimenter hit the shoe 
with a giant rubber hammer, the subject winced and registered an increase in skin 
conductance on a galvanic skin response test.  Integrating these experiments with the 
observations of phantom limb syndrome suggests “that the so-called body image, despite 
all its appearance of durability and permanence, is an entirely transitory internal construct 
that can be profoundly altered by the stimulus contingencies and correlations that one 
encounters35.” 
 The intricacies of phantom limbs and their relationship to body image suggest a 
conclusion quite opposite Lord Nelson’s.  Rather than simply the spontaneous firing of 
stump neuromas, as was originally thought, perception of a phantom limb actually 
corresponds to the result of integrating discrepant signals at quite a high level.  “To 
generate any stable percepts (such as one’s body image) or even a stable belief system the 
brain must weigh evidence from many different sources and quickly arrive at a 
decision35.”  This function, of “imposing coherence on information from diverse sources 
and for vetoing discrepancies,” is performed by parietal cortex, in order “to confer 
stability on behaviour, avoid indecisive vacillation and optimize the allocation of one’s 
cognitive and physical resources, given the ever-present need for rapid, effective 
action35.”  This explanation accounts for the clinical manifestations of phantom limb 
syndrome, incorporates a plausible evolutionary explanation, and illuminates a high-level 
processing system that performs some of the most complex functions of the human mind 
yet can be explained entirely by the brain. 
 In phantom limb-syndrome one perceives sensations that are not really there.  The 
opposite of this, a tactile analog of blindsight41, provides an interesting complement.  
Paillard, Michel, and Stelmach, a team of French neurologists, described a patient with a 
left parietal lobe defect resulting in tactile anesthesia on her right side.  In perfect analogy 
to blindsight, she did not consciously perceive when the experimenters touched her right 
arm.  This tactile irresponsiveness was complete; she did not respond “even to the 
strongest pressure41.”  However, when blindfolded and stimulated on her unfeeling right 
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arm and then asked to identify where she was touched, she was able to point to the 
location.  Her response, translated from the French, was “I don’t understand that!  You 
put something here.  I don’t feel anything and yet I go there with my finger… How does 
that happen41?” This bears a resemblance to D.B.’s comments, though the somatosensory 
version of residual sensory capacity without conscious awareness is perhaps more elusive 
than its visual analog because of the nature of this sensory system. 
 The somatosensory system also carries information about pain, the perception of 
which is another intimate faculty.  Pain perception is carried along a distinct pathway 
than the other somatosensory receptors, which can readily be demonstrated by 
hemisection of the spinal cord.  A lesion to the right side will result in loss of pain 
perception on the left and loss of touch and proprioception on the right because the pain 
fibers cross immediately whereas the others do not.  Pain signals are carried from 
receptors called nociceptors, which respond to a variety of painful stimuli, but pain and 
nociception are by no means functionally synonymous.  The latter refers to the 
stimulation of the pain receptor and the former to the perception of receptor activation as 
pain, perhaps pain2.  This is one of the most dramatic loci in the nervous system of a 
dissonance between receptor activation and perception.  Daniel Dennett argues that there 
is no such thing as pain1, he claims that “no identification of pains or painful sensations 
with brain processes makes sense” and that “pains or painful sensations are ‘things’ 
discriminated by people, not for example, by brains14.”  The argument is interesting 
because it highlights the uniquely subjective nature of pain perception, but one must be 
careful with Dennett, and the author addresses his latter statement by maintaining that the 
‘brain’ is necessarily the means by which ‘people’ ‘discriminate pains.’ 
 Pain is inherently subjective; it is often identified only by the subject’s reporting 
feeling pain.  The immediate counterarguments are that one can objectively identify 
nociceptor firing via neurophysiology, and that reflexive movements like withdrawal 
from painful stimuli can serve as indicators of pain perception in analogy to eye 
movements with vision.  However we have already noted the significant dissociation 
between pain and nociception, and as Dennett rightly points out, a reflexive explanation 
is incomplete, “although simple withdrawal may be the basic or central response to such 
stimulation, in man and higher animals it is not the only one14.”  Different people have 
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different thresholds for pain and people may describe pain differently based on a lifetime 
of experience.  A great degree of modulation occurs on the transduction of pain signals 
themselves, related to state of arousal, release of peptide neurotransmitters such as 
substance P that mediate hyperalgesia, and descending regulation whereby brain 
structures suppress nociceptor signaling.  Finally there is the observation of referred pain, 
such as chest pain felt during myocardial ischemia, resulting from converging inputs 
from the viscera and the skin nociceptors at the spinal cord.  These phenomena taken in 
concert perhaps make discussion of pain perception more elusive, but they do not render 
it inexplicable by the brain as Dennett suggests. 
 
The Frontal Lobes: 
 By this point, localization of brain function, not absolute in the phrenologists’ 
sense, but the implication of particular brain regions in particular functions, should have 
emerged as a motif.  The occipital lobes are involved in visual processing, the temporal 
lobes in auditory processing, and the parietal lobes in somatosensory awareness.  More 
specifically, a particular domain of this last region, the posterior parietal cortex, is 
involved in integrating multimodal information to generate coherent percepts and a sense 
of where the body is in space.  The high-level function of posterior parietal cortex, 
already explored in the context of phantom limbs, is rivaled by the frontal lobes, which 
are responsible for a class of capacities collectively called executive function, including 
working memory, planning, decision-making, attention, and monitoring and updating 
one’s own behavior32, 33, which makes them a perfect place in the brain to look for 
Descartes’ soul.  The frontal lobes are extensively developed in humans, comprising as 
much as a third of the entire cortex33, are much less so in other primates, and hardly at all 
in other mammals37.  Moreover they continue to develop well after birth, physically 
growing until the age of 737 and refining their connections until the early 20’s33.  The 
frontal lobes make connections with nearly all other parts of the brain, including internal 
reciprocal connections, reciprocal connections with sensory cortex, and connections to 
the hippocampus, hypothalamus, amygdala, and anterior cingulate cortex*.  These 
                                                     
* The hippocampus is involved in memory, the hypothalamus in regulation of homeostasis and 
neuroendocrine interaction, the amygdala in emotion, particularly fear response, and the anterior 
Hendriksen 61 
observations fit their role as being “concerned not with the ‘lower’ functions of 
movement and sensation, but the highest ones of integrating all judgment and behavior, 
all imagination and emotion, into that unique identity that we like to speak of as 
‘personality’ or ‘self’37.” 
 The same properties that make the frontal lobes likely candidates for many of the 
functions that Descartes attributes to the soul also render them less amenable to the 
methods of study that yielded much of the sensory information presented thus far.  
Having emerged so late on an evolutionary time scale, the frontal lobes are one of the 
structures where differences between humans and even our closest relatives may be most 
significant.  A great deal has been learned about executive function from primate studies, 
but this mode, with respect to the frontal lobes, is inherently harder both because of the 
nature of the functions being investigated and the extent to which the animal model is 
valid.  Likewise there are ethical limitations on what can be performed in humans.  A 
further complication is that the functions attributed to the frontal lobes are less concrete 
than those of other cortical areas; the statement V4 is involved in perception of color is 
less abstract than ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is involved in rule learning32.  It is also 
likely that many of these processes are more diffuse and involve numerous connections 
between various brain structures, and thus studying these functions by focal lesions, even 
if possible and ethically permissible, likely would still be less informative. 
 Frontal lobe lesions in humans do occur, and are the basis for much of the 
information that has been learned about their function.  Brain damage is inherently messy 
and does not respect cytoarchitectonic boundaries; a railroad spike selectively destroying 
only Brodmann’s area 46, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, has about the same likelihood as 
an asteroid colliding with the Earth and entirely destroying the state of Massachusetts 
while leaving Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Hampshire, and New York 
entirely unscathed.  Moreover there are a relatively small number of cases, that are 
necessarily heterogeneous, and thus a meta-analysis is not useful.  Instead, the historical 
strategy has been to look at these individual case studies and assess their similarities and 
differences.  This is our strategy here, and the intention is that the idiosyncrasies and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
cingulate is discussed below, and is perhaps even more elusive than the frontal lobes 
themselves33. 
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commonalities of this handful of patients will paint a picture of the frontal lobes such that 
we can ascribe to them many of the functions of Descartes’ soul.  Moreover the 
development of more sophisticated and higher resolution brain imaging technologies has 
enabled our knowledge of frontal lobe function to blossom tremendously in recent years.  
The survey begins with perhaps the most famous example of frontal lobe damage, 
Phineas Gage. 
 
Phineas Gage: 
 Prior to the accident that radically transformed his personality, Phineas P. Gage, a 
twenty-five year old construction foreman for Rutland & Burlington Railroad, “had a 
well-balanced mind and was looked upon by those who knew him as a shrewd, smart 
businessman, very energetic and persistent in executing all his plans of action12,” 
described by his bosses as the “most efficient and capable12” man in their employ.  That 
would all change in the summer of 1848, when Gage was performing the routine task of 
blasting rocks in order to clear a path for the railroad through Cavendish, Vermont.  In a 
freak accident where a member of Gage’s crew failed to properly cover the charge with 
sand, rather than blasting the rock as was intended, a three foot seven inch, thirteen and a 
quarter pound iron bar projected backward and “enter[ed] Gage’s left cheek, pierce[d] the 
base of the skull, traverse[d] the front of his brain, and exit[ed] at high speed through the 
top of his head12.”  Amazingly, the initial insult was minimal.  Gage was awake, shortly 
able to speak, and capable of getting up and walking to the ox cart that carried him away.  
He was treated shortly after physician John Harlow, who would describe the case in his 
1848 paper “Passage of an iron rod through the head26,” and pronounce Gage cured after 
two months. 
 In the paper he would write twenty years later however, “Recovery from the 
passage of an iron bar through the head27,” Harlow would reach a drastically different 
conclusion as the effects of Gage’s injury on his personality manifested.  He described 
the new Gage as 
 
“fitful, irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity which was not 
previously his custom, manifesting but little deference for his fellows, impatient 
of restraint or advice when it conflicts with his desires, at times pertinaciously 
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obstinate, yet capricious and vacillating, devising many plans of future operation, 
which are no sooner arranged than they are abandoned… A child in his 
intellectual capacity and manifestations, he has the animal passions of a strong 
man27,” 
 
in stark contrast to the ‘shrewd, smart businessman’ with a ‘well-balanced mind,’ 
“temperate habits and considerable energy of character12” whom he had been prior to the 
accident.  More concise and perhaps more poignant is the statement given by an 
acquaintance that “Gage was no longer Gage12.”  After the accident, Gage was no longer 
able to secure a job; his former employers at Rutland & Burlington “considered the 
change in his mind so marked that they could not give him his place again” despite his 
reputation as one of the ‘most efficient and capable’ foremen.  He met similar difficulty 
elsewhere, entertained a brief stint in the circus, and then returned to his mother and sister 
in California where he would die in 1861 in relative obscurity after experiencing a 
convulsion and never regaining consciousness. 
 Let us consider exactly what capacities or functions were disturbed in Gage’s 
case.  Harlow describes the post-accident Gage as ‘fitful, irreverent,’ and profane, which 
we can call social disinhibition, or failure to adhere to social rules and conventions that 
he had previously learned and followed.  He was ‘impatient of restraint or advice’ and 
‘capricious and vacillating;’ in other words, Gage demonstrated an inability to properly 
attend to something.  Finally, while Gage apparently made plans for the future, they were 
‘no sooner arranged than… …abandoned.’  Performing goal-directed behavior requires 
one first establish and identify a goal, formulate a plan to achieve the goal, hold the plan 
in working memory, and receive, assess, and respond to feedback in order to revise the 
plan if necessary.  Planning for the future involves anticipating consequences, as does 
adhering to social conventions.  In Gage this set of faculties was disturbed, and thus these 
abilities disappeared; “the equilibrium, or balance, so to speak, between his intellectual 
faculty and animal propensities had been destroyed12” and the new Gage, while perhaps 
intellectually intact, could not use these abilities to make appropriate social decisions. 
 Gage’s injury did not simply result in a depression of function, but a fundamental 
shift, i.e., not from A to a, but from A to B.  The analogy would be to a V4 lesion not 
resulting in loss of color vision, but a radically different experience of color vision, such 
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as suddenly seeing the world in fluorescence.  One could conceive a situation where the 
same capacities were destroyed, and the resulting Gage was unable to empathize or plan 
for the future, but largely frozen, apathetic, and passive.  That this was not the case 
reveals the intricacies of the frontal lobes.  Rather than a subdued version of his old self, 
he acquired a fundamentally different personality; ‘Gage was no longer Gage.’  His 
decisions were “not the reserved or slight decisions of someone whose mind is 
diminished and who is afraid to act12,” but rather equally assertive, just seemingly no 
longer guided by any sort of value system.  Gage was not unable to make decisions, he 
was unable to make good decisions. 
 The most remarkable feature of Gage’s case is the almost complete dissociation of 
the disturbance of personality and executive function from any other cognitive capacity.  
With the exception of blindness in his left eye, Gage had no sensory or motor deficits, 
and his perception, language, memory, and intelligence remained uncompromised.  In 
retrospect, the pairing of a focal lesion and highly specific cognitive dissociation profile 
is strong evidence for localization of brain function, another instance of the motif that has 
guided our exploration of sensation.  Mayr’s warning about awareness of one’s 
framework of ideas becomes relevant here, and in the nineteenth century, the scientific 
community was reluctant to accept this interpretation of Gage’s case: 
 
“to understand Gage’s behavioral change would have meant believing that normal 
social conduct required a particular corresponding brain region, and this concept 
was far more unthinkable than its equivalent for movement, the senses, or even 
language12” 
 
However the inevitable conclusion was that “the observance of previously acquired social 
convention and ethical rules could be lost as a result of brain damage, even when neither 
basic intellect nor language seemed compromised12.”  Further,  
 
“Gage’s example indicated that something in the brain was concerned specifically 
with unique human properties, among them the ability to anticipate the future and 
plan accordingly within a complex social environment; the sense of responsibility 
toward the self and others; and the ability to orchestrate one’s survival 
deliberately, at the command of one’s free will12” 
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The evidence seems to suggest that the capacities destroyed by Gage’s injury, a set 
curiously similar to the functions Descartes reserved for the soul – social behavior, 
ethical judgment, planning, and perhaps even the will itself, were located in, highly 
dependent on, or at least related to the frontal lobes. 
 We now turn from Gage’s cognitive profile to the physiological one.  This picture 
is slightly complicated considering there was no autopsy performed; in fact, Harlow did 
not even learn of Gage’s death for almost five years.  However he did eventually recover 
Gage’s skull, which, along with the iron now resides at the Warren Medical Museum at 
Harvard Medical School.  Thanks to a little detective work on the part of Hanna 
Damasio, which involved photographing Gage’s skull, using these measurements to 
construct a three-dimensional image of his brain, and then simulating the trajectory of the 
iron rod’s path through his brain, we now have an understanding of exactly which brain 
regions were damaged.  The nature of a penetrating injury is that it is focused and often 
the only damage is at the site where the tissue is actually destroyed, as opposed to the 
more widespread damage that would result from dissipation of force for a non-
penetrating injury.  This also explains way Gage remained conscious.  Damasio’s work 
reveals that Gage sustained damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and that the 
damage was more extensive on the left than the right side.  The ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (VM-PFC) has since been implicated in precisely these functions in humans and 
macaques.  Its function is essential for normal performance in delay tasks, where subjects 
are required to forego an immediate reward for a larger reward later; decision making 
assessments such as the Iowa Gambling Task†; and conflict tasks where a subject must 
inhibit a prepotent response, for instance reading, in favor of a novel response, color 
identification, such as saying ‘green’ rather than ‘red’ in response to the word ‘red’ 
printed in green32.  Antonio Damasio notes that VM-PFC damage “is accompanied by 
some disturbance of emotional behavior that includes both a diminished resonance of 
emotional reactions in general and a specific compromise of social emotions such as 
                                                     
† In this task, subjects are presented with four decks from which to choose cards.  Every card 
carries some amount of reward, play money, but some also carry penalties.  The object of the 
game is to win as much money as possible.  Some of the decks are ‘bad’ decks and over the long 
run are associated with overall loss, whereas others are ‘good’ decks are associated with net 
gains.  Normal subjects will after several trials identify this and only choose cards from the ‘good’ 
decks. 
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compassion and embarrassment13,” whereas lesions of the adjacent dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DM-PFC) “cause defects of decision but are not associated with the 
same emotional profile13,” suggesting a highly specific role for this structure with regard 
to the intersection between social, emotional, and decision-making capabilities. 
 We now come nearly full circle and consider Gage’s case from a philosophical 
perspective, reintroducing the concept of the soul, not the disembodied soul of Descartes, 
but rather as an entirely hypothetically and theoretical entity whose definition we 
postpone.  Damasio questions “Gage’s status as a human being12” after his accident.  
Indeed, ‘Gage was no longer Gage,’ but no longer human?  He “lost something uniquely 
human, the ability to plan his future as a social being12.”  William Calvin notes the 
absence of such long-term intentional planning in all other animal species8, and we add 
this to the candidate list of uniquely human capacities.  However even if a given capacity 
X is exclusively human, we propose a tentative list including language, ethics, free will, 
and ability to plan for the future, and we strip these capacities away from the person one 
at a time, it seems silly to say there is a point at which they cease to be human.  That is 
akin to saying that if you destroy a chameleon’s ability to blend in with its surroundings it 
suddenly ceases to be a chameleon.  However that does not preclude us from asking these 
questions, “[h]ow aware was [Gage] of this loss?  Might he be described as self-
conscious in the same sense that you and I are?  Is it fair to say that his soul was 
diminished, or that he had lost his soul12?”  Further, “May he be described as having free 
will?  Did he have a sense of right and wrong, or was he the victim of his new brain 
design, such that his decisions were imposed upon him and inevitable?  Was he 
responsible for his acts12?” 
 The author does not profess to have satisfactory answers for these questions.  
However the fact that we can pose them suggests that it is possible that these capacities 
can reside entirely in the brain and be explained entirely in terms of neurons and neural 
connections.  Damasio asks a similar question to the one we posed earlier, “What would 
Descartes have thought had he known about Gage and had he had the knowledge of 
neurobiology we now have12?”  Temporally, Gage’s case is only the halfway marker 
between Descartes’ time and our own, and already it seems likely that Descartes would 
no longer have a need to attribute the capacities of the soul to an extra-body entity.  We 
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conclude our discussion of Phineas Gage by enumerating the faculties that were 
destroyed by his injury, and will return to this list to evaluate its degree of overlap with 
the functions of the soul after considering a few other cases.  Damage to Gage’s 
prefrontal cortex resulted in his inability to observe social conventions, behave ethically, 
make decisions advantageous to his survival, plan for the future, and perhaps to be aware 
of this deficit or exercise free will. 
 
The Phineas Gage Matrix: 
 Damasio refers to this collection of frontal lobe patients with a similar cognitive 
profile – dissociated damage to social, emotional, ethical, volitional, and decision-making 
capacities as the ‘Phineas Gage matrix’.  He notes that “it is in the inevitable nature of 
syndromes to have a matrix, a shared essence of symptoms, and to have symptom 
variance around the edges of that essence12,” hence the strategy here of surveying a few 
additional cases before making some generalizations about frontal lobe function and its 
relation to the alleged soul.  In a case that preceded Gage, Dr. North, a master of Trinity 
College, Cambridge, was described as anxious and obsessive prior to a right hemisphere 
stroke, after which 
 
“His fears had left him.  His scrupulosity, his diffidence, his seriousness, even his 
morality – all had vanished.  He lay on his bed, in reckless levity, pouring forth a 
stream of flippant observations, and naughty stories, and improper jokes.  While 
his friends hardly knew which way to look, he laughed consumedly, his paralyzed 
features drawn up in a curiously distorted grin40.” 
 
This case bears some resemblance to Gage; David Ferrier observed a somewhat different 
profile in removing the frontal lobes from monkeys: 
 
“Notwithstanding this apparent absence of physiological symptoms, I could 
perceive a very decided alteration in the animal’s character and behaviour… 
Instead of, as before, being actively interested in their surroundings, and curiously 
prying into all that came within the field of their observation, they remained 
apathetic, or dull, or dozed off to sleep, responding only to the sensations or 
impressions of the moment37.” 
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On the one hand, this is seemingly the exact opposite of Gage and Dr. North; the 
lobotomized monkeys were characterized by passivity and apathy, whereas the human 
patients experienced a qualitative personality shift.  However Ferrier removed the entire 
frontal lobes, whereas, at least in Gage’s case the damage was known to be more focal; 
perhaps selective disruption of more subtle faculties was masked by the larger and more 
global effect of completely removing the frontal lobes.  Another possible implication is 
that over evolution the human frontal lobes have assumed a more specific function than 
even in our closest relatives.  Perhaps interest in one’s surroundings, selective attention 
and working memory‡, and short-term planning capabilities comprise the totality of the 
monkey’s executive function and as was the case with blindsight, an animal model can 
only take us so far in understanding a particular phenomenon. 
 There are also two developmental cases worth considering, one described by 
Donald Hebb and Wilder Penfield in 1940 and the other by S.S. Ackerly and A.L. Benton 
in 1948.  The Hebb-Penfield patient suffered bilateral frontal lobe destruction after an 
accident at sixteen years of age, and his social development was arrested, and previously 
acquired social behavior deteriorated.  The Ackerly-Benton patient sustained the injury 
shortly after birth, and despite normal cognitive development, his social development was 
abnormal.  While generally amiable and polite, he was prone to outbursts and sudden loss 
of interest and indifferent to reward or punishment.  Damasio notes the commonalities 
between these two developmental cases, 
 
“Rigid and perseverant in their approach to life, they both were unable to organize 
future activity and hold gainful employment; they lacked originality and 
creativity; they tended to boast and present a favorable view of themselves; they 
displayed generally correct but stereotyped manners; they were less able than 
others to experience pleasure and react to pain; they had diminished sexual and 
exploratory drives; and they demonstrated a lack of motor, sensory, or 
communication defects, and an overall intelligence within expectations12” 
 
Note the inability to plan for the future or function socially, as with Gage; the diminished 
drives, as in Ferrier’s monkeys and perhaps a function of the larger area damaged or the 
earlier onset; and the dissociation, which by now has become a nearly universal theme.  
                                                     
‡ Which, in humans, is associated with the DL-PFC, which would have also been removed in 
Ferrier’s experiments 
Hendriksen 69 
Moreover, consider the questions that we asked of Gage and the extent of his humanity 
after the accident.  They become even more difficult to answer in the context of the 
Ackerly-Benton patient, who never had a chance to develop these faculties.  To round out 
our picture of the Phineas Gage matrix, we now turn to two additional case studies, the 
first by Antonio Damasio of a patient named Elliot and the second by Oliver Sacks of a 
patient named Greg F. 
 
Elliot: 
 Damasio began seeing Elliot when he was in his early thirties.  He had developed 
severe and debilitating headaches, and was eventually diagnosed with a midline 
meningioma, a tumor the size of an orange that compressed his frontal lobes upward12.  
The tumor was surgically removed with the concomitant removal of frontal lobe tissue.  
As was the case with Gage, the primary operation was a success and Elliot was cured; the 
collateral damage, the fundamental personality change, began during his physical 
recovery. 
 Elliot became less effective at his job and seemed to lack motivation and time-
management skills.  While the finer skills required for his job were spared, he would 
often become consumed with the minutia of a particular task, and was unable to prioritize 
or see the big picture; “he might spend a whole afternoon deliberating on which principle 
of categorization should be applied… date, size of document, pertinence to the case, or 
another12.”  With respect to work, “his actions were unnecessarily detailed… …at the 
expense of the overall purpose12.”  This deficit quickly translated into his personal life, 
and after losing his job Elliot began a sporadic series of business ventures, eventually 
resulting in bankruptcy, divorce, and a “brief marriage to a woman of whom neither 
family nor friends approved12” and a subsequent second divorce; in short, a series of bad 
decisions one after another, and of quite large magnitude and far-reaching consequences.  
Damasio comments that “the machinery for his decision making was so flawed that he 
could no longer be an effective social being12.” 
 As with Gage, the profound dissociation is what makes cases like this truly 
fascinating.  Damasio describes Elliot as  
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“pleasant and intriguing, thoroughly charming but emotionally contained.  He had 
a respectful, diplomatic composure, belied by an ironic smile implying superior 
wisdom and a faint condescension with the follies of the world.  He was cool, 
detached, unperturbed even by potentially embarrassing discussion of personal 
events12.” 
 
This provides a sharp contrast to Gage, who was anything but ‘pleasant’ and ‘emotionally 
contained.’  Before turning to these differences though, consider those faculties of 
Elliot’s that remained intact.  His intelligence, awareness, and memory were unchanged.  
He exhibited normal, even superior performance on an IQ test and the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale.  Damasio performed a series of tests specifically designed to assess 
executive function.  Elliot had normal attention, a normal digit span, and normal working 
memory; Damasio notes that most patients with frontal lobe damage have abnormal 
performance on most, if not all of the tests that he performed on Elliot.  Even on tests 
having to do with ethics, social convention, and moral value, Elliot’s performance was 
normal. 
 What Damasio finally identified as Elliot’s hallmark deficit was nearly total 
emotional detachment.  He notes, “I found myself suffering more when listening to 
Elliot’s stories than Elliot himself seemed to be suffering12.”  The intellectual aspect of 
Elliot’s decision-making seemed unimpaired; the problem was rather in the execution, 
which Damasio attributes to this disaffectation. 
 
“Elliot was far more mellow in his emotional display now than he had been before 
his illness.  He seemed to approach life on the same neutral note.  I never saw a 
tinge of emotion in my many hours of conversation with him: no sadness, no 
impatience, no frustration with my incessant and repetitious questioning12.” 
 
To test this, he showed Elliot a series of images intended to elicit an emotional response, 
to which Elliot “could sense how topics that once had evoked a strong emotion no longer 
caused any reaction, positive or negative12.”  Aside from the primary observation of the 
disappearance of the capacity to respond emotionally, this highlights the extent of Elliot’s 
dissociation – he was completely aware of this.  Damasio challenges, 
 
“Try to imagine not feeling pleasure when you contemplate a painting you love or 
hear a favorite piece of music.  Try to imagine yourself forever robbed of that 
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possibility and yet aware of the intellectual contents of the visual or musical 
stimulus, and also aware that once it did give you pleasure.  We might describe 
Elliot’s predicament as to know but not to feel12.” 
 
 Like Gage, Elliot’s decision making was compromised.  In contrast though, this 
capacity was perhaps even more dissociated, and his case suggests the importance of 
emotional affectation on effective decision making.  Elliot’s damage was also to the VM-
PFC, though his was more extensive on the right side, perhaps suggesting some 
lateralization of function in prefrontal cortex.  We now add the experience of emotion 
and its apparent interconnectedness to rational decision making to frontal lobe functions 
that can be selectively disturbed.  Moreover with regard to Elliot the question of free will 
is settled somewhat less ambiguously.  The dissonance between his intellectual decision-
making and his performance on Damasio’s tests, compared to his real-world decision 
making and actual execution, is apparent, and one could feasibly conclude, which 
Damasio does, that Elliot lacked free will.  This allows us to perform an interesting 
exercise.  Consider the statement emotions have the capacity to affect the will, which 
Elliot’s example readily demonstrates.  Substituting some Cartesian phrases, ‘passions’ 
for ‘emotions’ and ‘soul’ for ‘will’ merely to acknowledge that for Descartes the former 
contains the latter, gives us passions have the capacity to affect the soul.  Not remarkable 
in and of itself, but this is essentially the thesis of Descartes’ Passions of the Soul, 
perhaps the most esoteric of all of his writing, and here we explain it entirely in terms of 
the brain. 
 
Greg F.: 
 Elliot’s case provided an example of an even more focal disturbance than Gage 
and allowed us to precisely consider the dissociation of emotional affect and rational 
decision making.  We now consider quite the opposite situation, with far more diffuse 
damage and a broader spectrum of impairments, a patient by the name of Greg F., and the 
subject of Oliver Sacks’ The Last Hippie37. 
 Like Elliot, Greg suffered from a midline tumor, though the diagnosis of his was 
impeded by his staying at a Hare Krishna temple where his diminishing vision, physical 
changes, disorientation, and strange smile were interpreted as ‘spiritual progress.’  By the 
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time it was diagnosed, Greg’s tumor was the size of a grapefruit, and had destroyed his 
pituitary gland, optic chiasm, optic tract, and major parts of his frontal and temporal 
lobes.  Destruction of his pituitary gland disrupted basic regulation of homeostasis; Greg 
became “fat and hairless.”  From the destruction of the optic tract, Greg was totally blind.  
He exhibited severe anterograde and retrograde amnesia.  His tumor was removed in 
1976, and he had no memory of anything since 1970, and his memory from prior to that 
was graded and improved as one went further back in time; memories from 1966 were 
largely intact.  His anterograde amnesia was even more pronounced; he could not recall a 
list of words after about a minute.  This is consistent with the destruction of Greg’s 
hippocampus, involved in forming new declarative memories, though Greg was able to 
slowly habituate, to which Sacks implicates a more primitive memory system.  An 
interesting feature of Greg’s amnesia was the singular exception of music; Greg was able 
to learn new songs and pick up limericks and jingles with ease. 
 With brain damage as extensive as Greg’s we face the danger of larger 
disturbances masking the more subtle ones.  Sacks notes that “widespread damage had 
created a very complicated clinical picture, with sometimes overlapping or even 
contradictory symptoms and syndromes37.”  Greg was described as “Unaware – and 
indifferent.  He seemed bland, placid, emptied of all feeling37.”  While this resembles 
Ferrier’s monkeys and Elliot, and could be attributed to frontal lobe damage, Sacks notes 
this could also be a manifestation of pituitary damage “undermining his hormonally 
driven aggressiveness and assertiveness37.”  He continues, describing Greg’s state as idle, 
“almost devoid of mental content or affect,” an “intermediate, half-dreamlike state in 
which, if the normal control and selectivity of thinking was lost, there was a half 
freedom, half compulsion, of fantasy and wit,” with “elements of the primitive, the 
childlike, the playful;” an “appearance of innocence and wisdom combined37.”  Yet he 
became animated by social contact, and was “invariably cheerful, euphoric37.” 
 Greg’s blindness was accompanied by blindness denial; while he admitted his 
vision was not very good, he still professed he could see, though he was in fact 
completely blind.  Sacks would show him an object, for instance, a green comb, and Greg 
would confidently identify it as a blue ball.  He professed that he enjoyed watching 
television.  As Greg progressed, they tried to teach him Braille, at which he became 
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frustrated and demanded, “What’s going on?  Do you think I’m blind?  Why am I here, 
with blind people all around me?  If I were blind, I would be the first person to know 
it37.” 
 Moreover Greg exhibited something called witzelsucht, or joking disease, a 
characteristic symptom of orbitofrontal patients, and perhaps a milder manifestation of 
what was observed in Gage and Dr. North.  It is characterized by reacting “immediately 
and incontinently to everything around them and everything within them – to virtually 
every object, every person, every sensation, every word, every thought, every emotion, 
every nuance and tone” with some loss of restraint, caution and inhibition and a 
propensity to “wordplay and puns37.” 
 This is perhaps a particular manifestation of what the author considers the single 
defining feature of Greg’s case – “his confinement, in effect, to a single moment – “the 
present” – uninformed by any sense of a past (of a future)37.”  Sacks identifies 
“something stranger, and more complex, than a mere “deficit,” rather some radical 
alteration within him in the very structure of knowledge, in consciousness, in identity 
itself37.”  He continues,  
 
“Given this radical lack of connection and continuity in his inner life, I got the 
feeling, indeed, that he might not have an inner life to speak of, that he lacked the 
constant dialogue of past and present, of experience and meaning, which 
constitutes consciousness and inner life for the rest of us.  He seemed to have no 
sense of “next” and to lack that eager and anxious tension of anticipation, of 
intention, that normally drives us through life37.” 
 
In comparison to Gage or to Elliot, Greg is perhaps the most debilitated, and if one were 
to arrange the elements of the Phineas Gage matrix along a spectrum and pose the set of 
questions that we did for Gage, Greg may be the easiest for whom to conclude that his 
humanity§ has been lost.  However Sacks’ comment is especially pertinent, the author 
concludes this section with Sacks’ words and postpones his own commentary until after 
the consideration of a final case: 
 
“Greg’s ‘frontal lobe’ characteristics – his lightness, his quickfire associations – 
were fun, but beyond this there shone through a basic decency and sensitivity and 
                                                     
§ Here referring to uniquely human faculties, not his status as a person. 
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kindness.  One felt that Greg, though damaged, sill had a personality, an identity, 
a soul37.” 
 
The Anterior Cingulate and the Will: 
 Antonio Damasio and Francis Crick both suggest that the anterior cingulate cortex 
is a candidate brain structure for the seat of the will.  We briefly explore this hypothesis 
in the context of a patient of Damasio’s, Mrs. T., not to support or reject it, but to assess 
to what extent we can ascribe a physiological basis to this last faculty, the will, which is 
highly intimate, perhaps uniquely human, and the one that Descartes most resolutely 
reserved for the disembodied soul. 
 Mrs. T. suffered a bilateral stroke that damaged regions of the anterior cingulate 
cortex, the supplementary motor area (SMA, or M2), and another motor area called M312.  
After the stroke, Mrs. T became “motionless and speechless, and she would lie in her bed 
with her eyes open but with a blank facial expression12.”  She was attentive yet 
irresponsive, able to  
 
“follow people with her eyes but [she] did not speak spontaneously.  She gave no 
verbal reply to any questions put to her even though it appeared she understood 
them because of the way she nodded in reply.  She could repeat words and 
sentences but only very slowly11.” 
 
Eventually “she gradually emerged from this state of mutism and akinesia12,” and it is her 
subsequent reflection on this period of ‘suspended animation’ that is most interesting. 
 
“Contrary to what one might have thought, her mind had not been imprisoned in 
the jail of her immobility.  Instead it appeared that there had not been much mind 
at all, no real thinking or reasoning.  The passivity in her face and body was the 
appropriate reflection of her lack of mental animation.  At this later date she was 
certain about not having felt anguished by the absence of communication.  
Nothing had forced her not to speak her mind.  Rather, as she recalled, “I really 
had nothing to say12.”” 
 
Contrast this with a patient with an active mind but motor, or even just verbal impairment 
who is merely unable to communicate.  While the motor damage could have masked the 
more subtle underlying deficit, in Mrs. T.’s case it seems this was not the case.  Crick 
claims, “Her mind had been ‘empty,’ she’d lost her Will11,” Damasio that “her will had 
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been preempted… …there was a pervasive impairment of the drive with which mental 
images and movements can be generated12.” 
 The anterior cingulate is involved in movement, emotion, and attentiveness; 
“damage to this sector causes a virtual suspension of the animation of action and of 
thought processes such that reason is no longer viable12.”  Lesioned patients showed 
decreased spontaneous behavior2, producing fewer verbal utterances during interviews, 
shorter written statements, and fewer and simpler constructions when asked to play with 
Tinker Toys in comparison to controls.  The anterior cingulate is also implicated in 
performance monitoring, a critical component of executive function whereby behavior is 
modified based on environmental feedback32.  A study in monkeys reveals the role of this 
structure in mediating behavioral modification in response to changing reward 
contingencies.  Monkeys were trained to perform two different tasks, either pushing or 
turning a handle, and were rewarded differentially for performing the tasks; when the 
reward decreased, the monkeys switched to the other task.  Researchers identified a 
population of neurons in the anterior cingulate that responded to decreasing reward.  
When the monkeys failed to switch tasks, these neurons did not fire, suggesting a specific 
brain mechanism that identifies decreasing reward and initiates a change in behavior, 
essentially volition, or the will.  In addition to the connections to prefrontal cortex and 
adjacent supplementary motor cortex, the anterior cingulate also connects extensively 
with the limbic system, leading Damasio to identify it as the intersection between 
emotion, reason, and external action12.  Crick notes extensive reciprocal callosal** 
connections and that each anterior cingulate projects to motor areas in both hemispheres, 
employing arguments similar to those that Descartes did for the pineal gland to implicate 
this structure as the seat of the will11. 
 
The Gage Matrix Reloaded: 
 Having surveyed each of the elements of the so-called Phineas Gage matrix, we 
now consider the faculties associated with the frontal lobes.  From Gage himself we have 
adherence to social convention, ethical behavior, making decisions advantageous to one’s 
                                                     
** Meaning that the anterior cingulate on one side projects across the corpus callosum, the large 
fiber tract connecting the two brain hemispheres, to the corresponding structure on the other side 
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well-being, planning for the future, and self-awareness.  Dr. North’s case underscores this 
first capacity, but we will call his contribution to the matrix social inhibition or restraint.  
The developmental cases of Hebb and Penfield and Ackerly and Benton add the ability to 
learn appropriate social behavior, experience of pleasure and pain, and sexual and 
exploratory drives.  Elliot contributes the ability to experience emotion, which as his case 
reveals is critical to efficacious decision making.  Greg F.’s profile of cognitive deficits is 
extensive, but his contribution to the Gage matrix is temporal awareness, not in the 
context of his amnesia, but his inability to detach himself from the immediate moment 
and to use knowledge of the past and future to influence his actions.  Finally we have 
Mrs. T., whose case may get at the will in its raw form, i.e. the ability to initiate a 
volition, whether it manifest internally as a conscious thought or externally as a motor 
command††.  A survey of frontal lobe cases reveals that each of these capacities can be 
perturbed solely by physical brain damage, and that therefore they can all be accounted 
for, though perhaps not yet adequately explained, by neurons and their interactions within 
the physical brain. 
 
Williams Syndrome: 
 Finally we turn to Williams syndrome, a rare genetic disorder that provides an 
additional window into brain function.  This disorder is characterized by a unique, 
dissociated, and highly stereotyped cognitive and social profile.  While not an attempt to 
qualify the extent of genetic determinism, the discussion of Williams syndrome and the 
implication that a particular genotype is highly correlated with specific complex 
personality and social attributes, intends to reinforce the ongoing current with a genetic 
perspective, an essential element of post-Cartesian science. 
 Williams syndrome is a rare neurodevelopmental genetic disorder that 
corresponds to a hemizygous deletion of between twenty and twenty eight genes on the 
                                                     
†† The author likes the analogy of Mrs. T’s case as a more general application of the destruction 
of the basal ganglia in Parkinson’s disease manifesting as difficulty initiating voluntary 
movements.  Normally, a motor loop through this structure, the basal ganglia, is required to 
initiate movement – activation, or more accurately overcoming inhibition, must be achieved above 
a certain threshold for a motor command to be initiated.  Consider the anterior cingulate as the 
analog of the basal ganglia and volition in its more general form as analogous to a motor 
command.  Likely the analogy only holds superficially if at all but the author finds it useful in 
illustrating this point. 
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long arm of chromosome seven, chromosome band 7q11.237, 34.  While genetic, it is not 
heritable; the deleted region in Williams syndrome, which is the same in ninety-eight 
percent of the one in twenty-thousand people who suffer from the disorder29, is flanked 
by regions of highly repeated DNA, and mispairing of these repeats during meiosis 
results in the deletion and resulting Williams syndrome phenotype.  It is this 
homogeneity, both genotypic and phenotype and mechanistic elegance and simplicity that 
makes the disorder relevant to our present discussion.  Julie Korenberg, one of the 
leading scientists presently studying Williams syndrome comments  
 
“here we have this really tiny genetic deletion — of the 20-some-odd genes 
missing, probably just 3 to 6 create the cognitive and social effects — that reliably 
creates a distinctive behavioral profile. Williams isn’t just a fascinating mix of 
traits. It is the most compelling model available for studying the genetic bases of 
human behavior21.” 
 
A corollary is that this compelling model allows us to ascribe a genetic, and therefore 
physiological, basis to these aspects of behavior. 
 It is important to realize however the complexity of genetic regulation of 
behavior.  It is not as if one of the twenty or so genes absent in Williams syndrome 
corresponds to fear response to threatening faces, and its absence results in the decreased 
amygdala activation observed in Williams patients in response to this stimuli compared to 
controls34.  Rather some of the genes are patterning genes, which have a global effect 
during embryonic development and according to Albert Galaburda, this abnormal brain 
development ultimately results in an imbalance between dorsal and ventral regions and 
their corresponding functions.  The former includes functions related to vision, spatial 
awareness, and intention, areas of noted weakness in Williams patients, whereas the latter 
includes language, auditory processing, facial recognition, emotion, music, and social 
drive, all of which are spared or even elevated21.  The role of experience and environment 
cannot be understated however; these pattering genes set in motion a genetic program 
with slightly different constraints, and thus brain development, social behavior, and 
identity necessarily take a different course.  Williams syndrome patients exhibit an 11% 
reduction in overall cerebral volume compared with controls, with selective losses in the 
thalamus, superior colliculus, parahippocampal gyrus, and occipital and parietal lobes36.  
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On the other hand, they showed increases in gray matter volume and density in several 
brain regions, including the amygdala, orbital and medial prefrontal cortices, anterior 
cingulate, fusiform gyrus, insular cortex, and superior temporal gyrus.  Ursula Bellugi 
also notes relatively normal cytoarchitecture, but decreased neuronal cell density, 
especially in the parietal regions7.  What emerges from this picture is a disorder 
characterized by a specific genotype and a relatively homogenous alteration in brain 
structure. 
 The clinical diagnosis is equally stereotypical.  Williams syndrome was first 
identified in 1961 by Dr. J. C. P. Williams of New Zealand who noted common 
symptoms in a series of cardiac patients.  Cardiovascular abnormality is the most serious 
physiological symptom; deletion of the elastin gene results in supravalvular aortic 
stenosis (SVAS)34.  Williams syndrome is also characterized by failure to thrive in 
infancy; transient neonatal hypercalcemia; delayed language and motor milestones, and 
abnormal sensitivities to classes of sounds, or hyperacusis7.  People with Williams 
syndrome also exhibit a distinct craniofacial dismorphology characterized by a “broad 
brow, full cheeks, stellate iris, flat nasal bridge, full nasal tip, long filtrum, prominent lips 
and ear lobes, small, widely spaced teeth, and wide mouth29.”  They also have marked 
cognitive deficits, with IQ scores ranging from 40-100 with a mean around 607.  
Consistent with the reduction of brain volume in particular regions, visuospatial 
impairment is the predominant cognitive deficit in Williams syndrome. 
 However the most interesting aspect of the disorder is the dissociation between 
spatial cognition, where there is profound impairment, and language and face processing, 
which are relative strengths, and the resulting behavioral profile termed the Williams 
social phenotype7, 21.  Bellugi, one of the pioneers in describing the disorder, comments 
on her patients, “I didn’t have to talk to them long to realize something special was going 
on. Here they had these great cognitive deficits. Yet they spoke with the most ardent and 
delightful animation and color21.”  Alan Reiss observes a similar profile of 
“disproportionately severe visual-spatial deficits and enhanced emotionality and face 
processing36.” 
 The Williams social phenotype is characterized by “indiscriminate friendliness, 
enhanced emotional empathy, and loquaciousness among adults29;” according to Bellugi, 
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“The language just seemed to be erupting out of them21.”  Or the account by a teenage 
girl with Williams syndrome, ‘Everyone in the world is my friend.’  Language use in 
those with Williams syndrome is complex.  On the one hand language is clearly a relative 
strength; note the loquaciousness in adults and the richer vocabulary to age matched 
controls among children.  However language development is not entirely normal; it 
actually begins later and likely follows a different trajectory than in normal subjects.  
Most notable are errors with spatial prepositions7, ‘near,’ ‘around,’ ‘in,’ ‘under,’ and 
excessive use of evaluative language29.  When asked to tell a story from a picture book, 
Williams subjects inserted far more examples of this evaluative language – enrichment 
devices, exclamatory phrases, and affective qualities than controls7. 
 Also elusive is the relationship between language and sociability.  An early 
hypothesis was that sociability drives language21, though the relationship is likely to be 
more complex.  The “love of company and conversation” characteristic of Williams 
syndrome is “combined, often awkwardly, with a poor understanding of social dynamics 
and a lack of social inhibition21.”  Williams subjects have a tremendous drive for social 
contact and interaction, but their social behavior is not always appropriate7.  In addition 
to those features peculiar to language use already noted, the Williams social phenotype is 
characterized by difficulty comprehending affect; “lost on them are many meanings, 
machinations, ideas and intentions that most of us infer from facial expression, body 
language, context and stock phrasings21.”  Despite facial processing and recognition 
being a relative strength, they are unable to infer intention from facial expression.  In fact, 
“cognitive scientists argue over whether people with Williams have theory of mind21.”  
Also in contrast to the heightened social drive and overall gregariousness is simultaneous 
increase in social anxiety36. 
 This anxiety however should not be confused with fear; in fact, the absence of 
social fear is another fundamental characteristic of the Williams social phenotype.  
Subjects displayed decreased amygdala activity compared to controls when presented 
with pictures of threatening faces, though there was no difference when both groups were 
presented with threatening objects21.  This is supported anecdotally as well; Williams 
subjects are more inclined to approach strangers and parents of children with Williams 
syndrome reported this as well on a questionnaire administered by Bellugi et al.29.  This 
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has been attributed to decreased amygdala activation by the orbitofrontal cortex in 
response to stimuli21, 29.  The orbitofrontal cortex, part of the frontal lobes, “is associated 
with prioritizing behavior in social contexts21.”  Abnormal development here results in 
abnormal connections between this region and the amygdala, and thus “abnormal neural 
circuitry underlying social–emotional information processing in Williams syndrome29.”  
Järvinen-Pasley et al., describe this lack of orbitofrontal activation and increased activity 
in medial prefrontal cortex and suggest its role in abnormal emotional behavior in 
Williams syndrome.  Moreover she draws an explicit parallel of this deficit in this context 
to its manifestation with frontal lobe damage. 
 Williams syndrome exemplifies a specific genetic alteration that manifests as a 
specific behavioral phenotype.  The interplay between genetic, epigenetic, 
developmental, environmental, and experiential factors is undoubtedly complex, but the 
relative homogeneity of the disorder at both ends – the underlying cause, a mere twenty-
eight genes, and the stereotypical profile, provides an elegant example of genetic control 
over behavior.  Moreover the behavioral alterations are subtle and complex, similar to 
those that we surveyed in discussing frontal lobe patients.  In analogy with the focal 
lesions employed to glean further information in those cases, Järvinen-Pasley identified a 
case with an atypically small deletion where the patient had many of the characteristics of 
Williams syndrome but lacked the social phenotype, further reinforcing that it is 
genetically influenced and also honing in on the specific genes responsible.  This 
disorder, in its elegance and simplicity, provides a “compelling model for elucidating the 
relationships between cognition, the brain and, ultimately, the genes7,” and a genetic 
dimension to our quest to render Descartes’ mind superfluous. 
 
Conclusions: 
 The question that remains is whether the preceding examples have sufficient 
explanatory power to allow us to dispense with the hypothesis of a disembodied soul and 
to conclude that there is no “absolute or metaphysical limit on the possibility of scientific 
explanation4,” but rather that each of our unique identities as an individual, consisting of 
a body and a mind, is entirely corporeal and that the latter can be explained entirely in 
terms of the brain. 
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 The goal of this investigation has been to demonstrate that there actually exists an 
underlying harmony between Descartes and twenty-first century neuroscience.  The first 
essential feature of this task is qualifying Descartes theory of mind and articulating it in 
the context of his entire ideology, which we have sought to do.  The tenets that we have 
extracted from returning to the primary Cartesian texts include the primacy of 
establishing reliable knowledge, an affinity for true explanation rather than mere 
displacement, and most importantly, a trend toward reducing the domain of the soul 
rather than expanding it.  Mind-body substance dualism is largely something that has 
been anachronistically read into Descartes, and while to some extent the cogito does 
necessitate that one look at the mind and body as distinct conceptual entities because of 
the inherent difference in how we can understand them, it does not necessitate that they 
are truly separate entities and that the former cannot be encapsulated by the latter.  
Viewing Descartes through the lens of substance dualism is in fact quite vehemently anti-
Cartesian in its broadest sense; while Descartes arrived at his conclusions by ‘razing 
everything to the ground’ and erecting new foundations, this approach takes a particular 
implication of the theory and renders it a first principle. 
 Clark asserts that “the Cartesian theory of mind is a first rather bold step in the 
direction of removing souls completely from explanations of human behaviour9,” and this 
author maintains that Descartes himself likely did not anticipate or intend this, but that 
with the understanding of evolution and cell theory and the explosion of knowledge in 
neuroscience, we can now take the next step in this process and completely reject the 
hypothesis of a disembodied soul.  Francis Crick observes that “the history of science is 
littered with statements that something was inherently impossible to understand.11”  
However as Crick’s own work in identifying the structure of DNA exemplifies, such 
statements are continually proven false and reflect an inadequate context for properly 
formulating a particular question rather than an inherent inaccessibility.  In Descartes’ 
time, a physiological understanding of the human mind was an enigma; in our own, it is 
more than feasible. 
 Discussion of theory of mind inevitably forces one to consider some of the 
philosophical questions that arise out of entertaining such an intimate capacity, and the 
implications of the answers to some of these questions have likely contributed to the 
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persistence of the disembodied soul hypothesis.  For whatever reason, humans have an 
affinity for the inexplicable and mysterious, equating this unintelligibility with sublimity.  
One gets the sense that being able to explain the entirety of our mental life in terms of 
neurons somehow renders it less impressive and diminishes our humanity.  This author 
fundamentally rejects that notion on the same grounds that understanding evolution as the 
mechanism of speciation renders it no less wonderful.  In fact, the author asserts the 
contrary, that understanding is actually enriching and secondarily adds that such a fear is 
unnecessary, as we are a long way off from completely understanding the human mind.   
The philosophical dilemma is to identify what makes us uniquely human and 
how.  The Cartesian solution to this problem was to assign those capacities to the soul 
and assert that only humans have souls; the set includes some degree of conscious 
perception, executive function, and the will.  Descartes asserts, “the control of animal 
inclination by thought, reason, and the will was what made us human;” Antonio 
Damasio’s response to this underscores the crux of the present argument:  
 
“I agree with his formulation, except that where he specified a control achieved 
by a nonphysical agent I envision a biological operation structured within the 
human organism and not one bit less complex, admirable, or sublime12.” 
 
Damasio says elsewhere that 
 
“The fact that acting according to an ethical principle requires the participation of 
simple circuitry in the brain core does not cheapen the ethical principle.  The 
edifice of ethics does not collapse, morality is not threatened, and in a normal 
individual the will remains the will12” 
 
Once one can dispense with the prejudice that an understanding of a phenomenon renders 
it less spectacular, the task of reconciling seventeenth century philosophy with twenty-
first century neuroscience and beginning to understand the physiological mind becomes 
less arduous.  Rather than antagonistic, Cartesian philosophy and modern neuroscience 
are actually quite in accordance and ideas from the former can prove useful in the 
development of the latter.  We can now move the problem of understanding the 
physiological mind from the third category of Descartes’ Regulae, where the question 
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could not yet be formulated* to the second category, where the problem has not been 
solved but at least the question has been posed and we have opened the black box of the 
mind-brain duality that has been remained closed for four centuries and begun to 
investigate its mechanisms.  This search will lead to further black boxes, but the 
fundamental difference is how we address the problem, rejecting the notion of an 
‘absolute or metaphysical limit on the possibility of scientific explanation’ just as when 
Laplace described his account of the universe to Napoleon, and he inquired as to the role 
of God in Laplace’s system, Laplace replied “'Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-
là,” or “I have no need of that hypothesis.” 
                                                     
* Ironically, Descartes never finished writing this third section. 
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